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EMPLOYMENT LAW AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 
Samuel R. Bagenstos* 
ABSTRACT 
 What is the normative justification for individual employment 
law?  For a number of legal scholars, the answer is economic efficiency.  
Other scholars argue, to the contrary, that employment law protects 
against (vaguely defined) imbalances of bargaining power and 
exploitation.  Against both of these positions, this paper argues that 
individual employment law is best understood as advancing a particular 
conception of equality.  That conception, which many legal and political 
theorists have called social equality, focuses on eliminating hierarchies of 
social status.  Drawing on the author’s work elaborating the justification 
for employment discrimination law, this paper argues that individual 
employment law is justified as preventing employers from contributing to 
or entrenching social status hierarchies—and that it is justifiable even if it 
imposes meaningful costs on employers. 
The paper argues that the social equality theory can help us 
critique, defend, elaborate, and extend the rules of individual employment 
law.  It illustrates the point by showing how concerns about social 
equality, at an inchoate level, underlie some classic arguments against 
employment-at-will.  It also shows how engaging with the question of 
social equality can enrich analysis of a number of currently salient 
doctrinal issues in employment law, including questions regarding how 
the law should protect workers’ privacy and political speech, the proper 
scope of maximum-hours laws and prohibitions on retaliation, and the 
framework that should govern employment arbitration.   
 
                                                 
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.  I presented an early 
version of this paper at the Seventh Annual Colloquium on Current Scholarship 
in Labor and Employment Law, and I very much appreciate the comments and 
suggestions made by colloquium participants.  Thanks as well to Andrea Taylor 
and Jennifer Utrecht for their helpful research assistance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 What is the normative justification for individual 
employment law?1  Why should the law regulate the employment 
relationship in any way distinct from any other contractual 
relationship?  In order to determine what sorts of regulations the 
law should impose on the employment relationship, we need to 
answer these questions.   
                                                 
1 When I refer in this paper to “individual employment law,” or the shorthand 
“employment law,” I refer to those legal doctrines that govern the employment 
relationship but that do not prohibit group-based discrimination (which would 
be “employment discrimination law”) and do not regulate unionization and 
collective bargaining (which would be “labor law”).  For an argument that 
distinctions between these three pillars of workplace law are increasingly 
dissolving—a dissolution to which my argument would, at one level, 
contribute—see Richard Michael Fischl, Rethinking the Tripartite Division of 
American Work Law, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 163 (2007). 
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For a number of legal scholars, notably Dean Stewart 
Schwab and Professor Alan Hyde, the answers to these questions 
are straightforward.  Individual employment law, these scholars 
argue, is justified if, and to the extent that, it serves the goal of 
economic efficiency. 2   Employment law rules should thus be 
explained, assessed, and if necessary reformed, based on whether 
they make labor markets more efficient. 
In line with that argument, employment law scholarship 
fairly drips with economic-efficiency analysis.  The number of 
employment law articles relying on economic arguments is far, far 
too numerous to cite or even count them all.  But let me just note a 
couple of telling data points.  A leading casebook on employment 
law employs economic efficiency as its first “strong unifying 
theme[],” and it “attempts to use economics to relate seemingly 
disparate issues and to explore issues in a rigorous way.”3  Leading 
defenses and critiques of employment law’s baseline principle—the 
at-will rule—rely heavily on economic analysis.4  Indeed, one can 
find leading scholars offering economic analyses of virtually any 
employment-law problem.5  Although much scholarship relating to 
particular employment-law issues continues to take the form of 
traditional doctrinal analysis, it is fair to say that economic 
efficiency provides the only overarching normative theory of 
employment law. 
                                                 
2 See Alan Hyde, What is Labour Law?, in BOUNDARIES AND FRONTIERS OF LABOR 
LAW: GOALS AND MEANS IN THE REGULATION OF WORK 37 (Guy Davidov & Brian 
Langille, eds., 2006); Stewart J. Schwab, Predicting the Future of Employment Law: 
Reflecting or Refracting Market Forces?, 76 IND. L.J. 29 (2001).  See also Alan Hyde, 
Response to Working Group on Chapter 1 of the Proposed Restatement of Employment 
Law: On Purposeless Restatement, 13 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMPLOYMENT POL’Y J. 87, 89 
(2006) (arguing that employment legislation is “typically adopted when market 
failures”—such as “inelasticity in the supply of labor; collective action problems 
among workers; low trust and opportunism that prevent the formation of 
efficient long-term contracts; and information asymmetries”—“prevent atomized 
markets from reaching efficient results”).  
3  STEVEN L. WILLBORN, STEWART J. SCHWAB, JOHN F. BURTON, JR., & GILLIAN 
LESTER, EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 10 (5th ed. 2012). 
4 See, e.g., Rachel Arnow-Richman, Just Notice: Re-Reforming Employment at Will, 
58 UCLA L. REV. 1, 13-14 (2010); Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at 
Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947 (1984); Andrew P. Morriss, Bad Data, Bad Economics, 
and Bad Policy: Time to Retire Wrongful Discharge Law, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1901 (1996); 
Cass R. Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 106, 120-122 (2002). 
5  For a recent example, see CHRISTINE JOLLS, RATIONALITY AND CONSENT IN 
PRIVACY LAW (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (discussing worker 
privacy protections).  For an older example, see Richard McAdams, Relative 
Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. 1, 21 (1992) (discussing workplace safety protections). 
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To the extent that scholars challenge economic efficiency as 
the normative justification for employment law, they tend to argue 
that the government should regulate the employment relationship 
in order to rectify imbalances of bargaining power between 
employers and employees.  Employment law, in this view, 
“[p]rotect[s] the weaker party to the employment contract” against 
“exploit[ation].”6  As I argue below, the asymmetric vulnerability of 
(most) employers and (most) workers is an important building 
block in justifying employment law.  But the concept of unequal 
bargaining power is notoriously slippery.7  And the best arguments 
for imposing duties on employers focus not on fairness to individual 
employees but on the systemic effects—in and out of the 
workplace—of allowing employers to engage in particular 
practices. 
In this paper, I offer a normative theory of individual 
employment law that focuses on these sorts of systemic effects.  
That theory draws on my earlier work that offered a normative 
justification for employment discrimination law. 8   In that earlier 
work, I argued that employment discrimination law serves the goal 
of advancing social equality.  Although employment discrimination 
law imposes undeniable costs on employers, I argued that those 
costs are justified, because employers can properly be required to 
forego some profit in order to avoid contributing to a system of 
social inequality.  
A very similar argument, I contend, provides a justification 
for individual employment law.  Individual employment law, I 
argue, can be profitably understood as pervasively promoting 
social equality.  Social equality, as described by a number of 
scholars, seeks “a society in which people regard and treat one 
another as equals, in other words a society that is not marked by 
status divisions such that one can place different people in 
hierarchically ranked categories.” 9   Specific employment-law 
                                                 
6 Stewart J. Schwab, The Law and Economics Approach to Workplace Regulation, in 
GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 91, 111 (Bruce E. 
Kaufman, ed., 1997) (describing the dominant view “[o]utside the law-and-
economics camp”). 
7 See Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort 
Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 
MD. L. REV. 563, 615-620 (1982). 
8  See Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” Accommodation, and the 
Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825, 837-870 (2003). 
9 David Miller, Equality and Justice, 10 RATIO 222, 224 (1997).  For other recent 
elaborations of the theory, see Carina Fourie, What is Social Equality? An Analysis 
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doctrines, I argue, can be profitably elaborated, assessed, and 
critiqued by reference to that conception of equality.  
When applied to employment discrimination law, the notion 
of social equality has had a distinctly group-oriented cast.  In my 
own work on employment discrimination and social equality, for 
example, I argued that antidiscrimination law should be 
understood as ensuring that socially salient racial, gender, 
disability, or other groups do not experience stigma or systematic 
disadvantage. 10   That, I explained, is what justifies the law’s 
protection of particular classes and prohibition of particular 
classifications.11 
But outside of the antidiscrimination precinct, individual 
employment law does not protect particular classes or axes of 
identity.  Its protections are, in an important sense, universal.12  The 
social equality that individual employment law can protect is also 
universal.  It targets not merely those practices that entrench caste-
based deprivations but also those practices that would tend to 
undermine any worker’s status as an equal to his or her employer, 
boss, or supervisor.  When we explore the application of 
employment law outside of the discrimination context, we will find 
that concerns about social equality—although not named as such—
lie at the heart of the questions the doctrine asks and answers. 
                                                                                                                         
of Status Equality as a Strongly Egalitarian Ideal, 18 RES PUBLICA 107 (2012); T.M. 
SCANLON, WHEN DOES EQUALITY MATTER? (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
author).  For a recent application to tort law, see Jason M. Solomon, Civil Recourse 
as Social Equality, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 243 (2011).  Other scholars have used the 
labels “equal citizenship,” e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term—
Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1 
(1977); “social citizenship,” e.g., T.H. MARSHALL, CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL CLASS 
(1950); William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1 
(1999); “democratic citizenship,” e.g., MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A 
DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 276-278 (1983); or “democratic equality,” 
e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson, What is the Point of Equality?, 109 ETHICS 287, 289 
(1999); to refer to roughly the same idea. 
10 See Bagenstos, supra note 8, at 839-840. 
11 See id. at 846-848. 
12 A focus on bolstering the rules of individual employment law thus responds to 
calls for universalistic social-welfare interventions, see, e.g., SAMUEL R. 
BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT 
143-145 (2009), and in particular for interventions in the employment relationship 
that focus on social class as much as on other group identities, see, e.g., Forbath, 
supra note 9; but cf. Guy Davidov, The Goals of Regulating Work: Between 
Universalism and Selectivity, ___ U. TORONTO L.J. ___ (forthcoming) (arguing that 
labor and employment law should not entirely abandon the selective approach in 
favor of a universalistic one). 
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This is not to say that employment law’s rules, as currently 
structured, always do promote social equality.  Indeed, one of the 
benefits of a social-equality focus is that it offers a critical lens 
through which we can examine current doctrine.  When viewed 
through that lens, many of today’s employment-law rules come up 
short.  But a focus on social equality helps to show that the 
seemingly disparate critiques of a wide array of doctrines can be 
profitably understood as stemming from the same underlying goal.  
Although the general principle of social equality can hardly dictate 
answers to specific doctrinal questions, it can orient critiques of the 
current doctrine and ground a case for reform.  Or so I hope to 
show. 
I do not, of course, write on a completely clean slate here.  In 
an article on the diverse philosophical foundations of labor and 
employment law, Dean Horacio Spector devoted four pages to 
arguing that what he called “equal autonomy”—roughly what I call 
social equality—offered one of the more promising normative bases 
for regulation of the workplace. 13  My project here also has 
undeniable affinities with Professor Noah Zatz’s argument that the 
minimum wage—a paradigm individual-employment regulation—
can be justified in civil rights terms. 14   Indeed, Professor Zatz 
expressly analogized to my earlier antidiscrimination work in 
support of his argument.15  Professor Aditi Bagchi also has argued 
for taking social equality into account in employment law, though 
she does not offer social equality as an overarching theory of the 
law in this area.16  My project has an affinity, too, with Professor 
David Yamada’s argument “that human dignity should supplant 
‘markets and management’ as the central framework for analyzing 
and shaping American employment law,”17—though I think that 
                                                 
13 See Horacio Spector, Philosophical Foundations of Labor Law, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
1119, 1144-1147 (2006).  Professor William Forbath has similarly shown how 
ideas of social equality played a crucial role in the adoption of (collective) labor 
law in the United States.  See Forbath, supra note 9, at 59-60, 69-70. 
14 See Noah D. Zatz, The Minimum Wage as a Civil Rights Protection: An Alternative 
to Antipoverty Arguments?, 2009 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 5 (arguing that “ongoing 
resistance to economic reductionism in the realm of civil rights—as occurs in 
antidiscrimination law—is forging intellectual tools of wider significance” that 
help us see that economic “analysis arguably misses the point” when justifying 
the minimum wage). 
15 See id. at 42-43.   
16 See Aditi Bagchi, The Myth of Equality in the Employment Relation, 2009 MICH. ST. 
L. REV. 579.   
17 David C. Yamada, Human Dignity and American Employment Law, 43 U. RICH. L. 
REV. 523, 524 (2009). 
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social equality, rather than the more multifaceted concept of human 
dignity, offers a more helpful organizing principle. 18   And it 
resonates with Professor Richard Michael Fischl’s argument that 
“forthrightly pursuing [workplace law] reform in the name of 
social values such as democratic and humane ordering” is “a more 
promising starting point than casting our lot with the supposed 
laws of supply and demand.”19  But this paper represents, I think, 
the first systematic effort to describe and defend a social equality 
theory of individual employment law and to sketch its implications 
for an array of employment-law doctrines. 
My argument proceeds as follows.  Part I sets forth the basic 
normative argument for a social equality theory of employment 
law.  In that part, I first describe the notion of social equality and 
defend it as an attractive conception of equality.  I then turn to 
examining what sorts of social and institutional practices social 
equality demands.  Finally, I discuss some important limitations of 
the social equality principle, with a particular focus on employers’ 
interests in avoiding costly regulation. 
Part II examines how social equality can help us understand, 
explain, and critique a wide variety of employment-law doctrines.  
In that part, I first show how social equality concerns underlie some 
classic critiques of the employment-at-will rule.  I then explain how 
social equality illuminates a number of enduring and currently hot 
debates in the employment-law field, including those regarding 
workers’ privacy, out-of-work political speech, and 
whistleblowing, as well as the role of arbitration in resolving 
employment disputes and, finally, the coverage of maximum-hour 
legislation.  As I hope to show, employment law pervasively 
implicates questions of social equality.  I end with a brief 
conclusion. 
I.  A SOCIAL EQUALITY THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT LAW 
 In an article published a decade ago, I argued that 
employment discrimination law is justified because it prohibits 
employers from contributing to entrenched social inequalities.20 I 
contended that the goal of antidiscrimination law, rather than 
                                                 
18 Cf. Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 169 
(2011) (describing various conceptions of dignity in American law, of which 
equality is only one). 
19 Richard Michael Fischl, Labor Law, the Left, and the Lure of the Market, 94 MARQ. 
L. REV. 947, 957-958 (2011). 
20 See Bagenstos, supra note 8, at 837-870. 
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enforcing a rule of interpersonal ethics, was to eliminate a system 
that entrenched subordination and occupational segregation—key 
threats to social equality.21  Employer discrimination, of course, is a 
central component of such a system.  I argued that it was fair to 
impose liability on a discriminating employer—at least where the 
employer “can avoid contributing to the social harms of 
subordination at a reasonable cost”—because such an employer is 
at fault: “[H]e would rather retain some personal benefit (be it the 
satisfaction of a taste for discrimination, or the realization of 
dollars-and-cents profits) than avoid contributing to a 
subordinating system.”22  I argued that this justification provided 
support not only for prohibitions on animus-based discrimination 
but also for prohibitions on “rational” intentional discrimination—
and even for requirements of reasonable accommodation.23 
 In this part, I argue that a roughly parallel argument can be 
made to justify—and elaborate and evaluate the rules of—
individual employment law.  I contend that we should understand 
the goal of individual employment law, like the goal of 
employment discrimination law, as promoting social equality.  But 
the threats to social equality are different outside of the 
discrimination context.  Where employment discrimination law 
targets the threats to social equality caused by occupational 
segregation and group-based subordination, individual 
employment law should be understood as targeting the threat to 
social equality posed by a boss’s ability to leverage her economic 
power over workers into a more general social hierarchy in and out 
of the workplace.  As I show in Part II below, employers have 
numerous opportunities to exploit this sort of leverage.  Many of 
the key debates in employment law—both the enduring debates 
and those that are especially “hot” today—can be well understood 
as focusing on this social equality concern.  Just as in the 
employment discrimination context, the employer is in the best 
position to avert these threats to social equality, for it is the 
employer’s acts that construct and entrench a system of social 
hierarchy.  And as with employment discrimination law, individual 
employment law, properly construed, imposes only a reasonable 
burden on employers to counteract these threats. 
 In the remainder of this part, I flesh out that argument.  
Section A offers a general description and defense of the concept of 
                                                 
21 See id. at 839-844. 
22 See id. at 858. 
23 See id., passim. 
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social equality as it has been articulated by legal and political 
theorists.  Section B draws out what social equality demands of 
legal and social institutions, with a particular focus on how those 
demands play out beyond the context of group-based stigma and 
subordination that has been the major focus of social equality 
advocates in the legal academy.  Finally, Section C discusses the 
limits on what social equality can legitimately demand of 
employers. 
A.  A Description and Defense of Social Equality 
At its most fundamental level, social equality is the idea 
that—regardless of the various material inequalities that are 
pervasive and may be inevitable—each of us deserves to be treated 
as an equal member of our community.24  We each are thus equally 
entitled to participate fully in the public life (political and civic) of 
our democratic republic.  We are entitled to be “free from 
domination.”25  And we each are entitled to equal “deference or 
regard”26 in our everyday relations with others in the community.  
As Professor Walzer puts it, “[t]his is the lively hope named by the 
word equality: no more bowing and scraping, fawning and 
toadying; no more fearful trembling; no more high-and-mightiness; 
no more masters, no more slaves.”27  Professor Karst captures the 
point by quoting the following (aspirational) line from Simone de 
Beauvoir: “’[T]he rich American has no grandeur; the poor man no 
[servility]; human relations in daily life are on a footing of 
equality.’”28  Perhaps this form of social equality finds its ultimate 
expression in George Orwell’s observations of Barcelona early in 
the Spanish Civil War: “Waiters and shop-walkers looked you in 
the face and treated you as an equal.  Servile and even ceremonial 
forms of speech had temporarily disappeared.”29  Borrowing from 
Professor Walzer and philosopher Gerald Gaus, Professor Jason 
Solomon refers to “a socially-equal society” as “a ‘society of 
                                                 
24 See, e.g., WALZER, supra note 9, at 277 (describing “[d]emocratic citizenship” as 
a status in which “[t]here is one norm of proper regard for the entire population 
of citizens” and in which the norms of respect depend not on social position but 
on treating ourselves and others as “full and equal member[s]” or “active 
participant[s]” in the community); Karst, supra note 9, at 5 (“The essence of equal 
citizenship is the dignity of full membership in the society). 
25 WALZER, supra note 9, at xiii. 
26 Karst, supra note 9, at 6. 
27 WALZER, supra note 9, at xiii. 
28 Karst, supra note 24, at 11 (quoting SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, AMERICA DAY BY DAY 
261 (1953)). 
29 GEORGE ORWELL, HOMAGE TO CATALONIA 5 (1952). 
9
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misters,” where . . . everyone from the gardener to the CEO is 
addressed as ‘mister’”—in other words, a society marked by “’the 
absence of any natural ranking of individuals into those who 
command and those who obey.’”30 
Why should the law serve this conception of equality?  A 
variety of theoretical perspectives might lead one to find social 
equality attractive.  From a Kantian liberal perspective, one might 
start from the premise that each individual is of “equal moral 
worth”31 and deserves “equal concern and respect.”32  As Professor 
Fourie argues, “[a] rather straightforward interpretation of equal 
moral worth would be likely to consider it incompatible with 
treating people as inferior or superior.”33  One might get to the 
same place from a communitarian perspective.  The argument 
would run that all members of our community deserve equal 
respect, not by virtue of anything intrinsic to the moral worth of 
persons, but instead because of their membership in the 
community.34  One might also get there by way of the American 
Republican tradition, which opposed domination, subordination, 
and hierarchy, and which found expression—among other places—
in the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment.35 
 In legal and philosophical writing, the conception of social 
equality is typically deployed as an argument against practices that 
impose group-based harm.  This group-based understanding of 
social equality underlies many commentators’ defenses (including 
my own) of antidiscrimination law. 36  Professor Karst argues that 
“even in these applications, the main energies released by the equal 
                                                 
30 Solomon, supra note 9, at 254 (quoting WALZER, supra note 9, at 252; and 
GERALD GAUS, POLITICAL CONCEPTS AND POLITICAL THEORIES 143 (2000)). 
31 E.g., Anderson, supra note 9, at 312; Fourie, supra note 9, at 118. 
32  E.g., RONALD DWORKIN, SOEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF 
EQUALITY 6 (2000); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 198-199, 273 
(1977); DEBORAH HELLMAN, WHEN IS DISCRIMINATION WRONG? 6 (2008). 
33 Fourie, supra note 9, at 118. 
34 Professor Walzer’s arguments tend in this direction, see WALZER, supra note 9, 
at 276-277, as do Professor Sandel’s related arguments against certain sorts of 
commodification.  See, for example, Chapter 1 of MICHAEL J. SANDEL, WHAT 
MONEY CAN’T BUY: THE MORAL LIMITS OF MARKETS (2012), which I think is best 
understood as making a communitarian argument that the queue is often a fairer 
means of distribution than the market. 
35 See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Dangerous Thirteenth Amendment, 
112 COLUM. L. REV. 1459 (2012). 
36 See, e.g., ANDREW KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 
(1996); Karst, supra note 9.  I cite other examples in Bagenstos, supra note 8, at 
839-844. 
10
Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 62 [2013]
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/62
 10
citizenship principle are individualistic.”37   Whether or not one 
agrees with that assessment, it should be evident that the idea of 
equal citizenship or social equality has substantial applications 
even outside of the context of group-based discrimination.  
Practices that entrench hierarchies based on socio-economic class, 
for example, clearly raise social equality concerns,38 as do practices 
that create other social-status hierarchies.39  In Part II, I argue that 
many employment practices—even those that draw no group-
based distinctions—raise social equality concerns of the latter sort. 
 To be sure, one can imagine objections—from both 
directions—to a focus on social equality.  On the one hand, one 
might argue that social equality does not go far enough as a theory 
of equality.  Any fully satisfying conception of equality, one might 
argue, must focus on distribution of material goods.40  And, indeed, 
in American political discourse, the supporters of social equality 
have included neoliberals who have used the conception to argue 
against redistributive welfare policy.41 
 There is much to this point, though political and legal 
philosophers have gone around and around in debating which of 
these theories of equality deserves our allegiance.  Scholars such as 
Professors Elizabeth Anderson and Carina Fourie have argued that 
what I call social equality is in fact the most attractive specifically 
egalitarian conception of equality. 42   Moreover, Professor David 
Miller and others have narrowed the practical gap between social 
and distributive equality theories by emphasizing the degree to 
which a more equal distribution is necessary to secure social 
equality.43  But these arguments are not essential to my position.  I 
                                                 
37 Karst, supra note 24, at 8.  In a recent article, Professor Karst brings the point 
full circle by arguing that protecting fundamental individual liberties can 
advance the equal-citizenship status of members of disadvantaged and 
stigmatized groups.  See Kenneth L. Karst, The Liberties of Equal Citizens: Groups 
and the Due Process Clause, 55 UCLA L. REV. 99 (2007). 
38 See, e.g., Forbath, supra note 9. 
39 See Miller, supra note 9, at 232. 
40  For an argument against distributive equality as the theory underlying 
employment discrimination law, see Bagenstos, supra note 8, at 840-841. 
41 E.g., MICKEY KAUS, THE END OF EQUALITY (1992). 
42 See Anderson, supra note 9, at 312-313; Fourie, supra note 9, at 108. 
43 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 9, at 235 (“If we want our society to be egalitarian, 
then we will try to shape our distributive practices so that the emergence of 
hierarchy is discouraged; in particular we will try to avoid the emergence of 
large-scale, cumulative inequalities of advantage which make it difficult for 
people to live together on terms of equality, even if politically they are all defined 
as equals.”). 
11
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do not argue that social equality is the only or even the most 
attractive conception of equality, only that it is the one that is most 
relevant to understanding, elaborating, and critiquing the body of 
individual employment law.  For that purpose, it is enough that 
social equality represents at least one attractive conception of 
equality, and that it is a conception that employment law is well 
positioned to serve.   
As I argue in Part II, the law governing individual 
employment relationships is in fact especially well positioned to 
serve the goal of social equality—even if current rules do not 
always live up to their potential.  And while aspects of individual 
employment law (notably the minimum wage) may also serve 
more distributive egalitarian goals, much of that body of law is 
irrelevant to—or even in tension with—those goals. 44   Social 
equality may in fact be the theory that holds the greatest capacity to 
explain and justify the overall sweep of individual employment 
law. 
 From the other direction, one might argue that social 
equality—however justifiable as a guide to individual ethics or 
morality—is not something the state can or should mandate.  Such 
a conception of equality, one might argue, smacks of mind control 
and the inappropriate imposition of politically correct views on the 
populace.45  To be sure, some theorists of social equality—notably 
Professor Andy Koppelman—argue that the law should engage in a 
thoroughgoing “project of cultural transformation” that aims to 
eliminate (without necessarily directly suppressing) those attitudes 
that sustain social inequality. 46   Such a project does have 
disturbingly illiberal overtones.  But one need not understand the 
social equality project as being quite so ambitious.  A legal regime 
can seek to advance social equality by focusing on conduct rather 
than attitudes—by eliminating the practices and economic levers 
that empower individuals consequentially to treat others as 
hierarchical subordinates.  As I argue in Part II, this is a conception 
of social equality that fits individual employment law well. 
B.  What Does Social Equality Demand? 
                                                 
44  For an attempt to justify the minimum wage not as aiming at material 
redistribution so much as at social equality, see Zatz, supra note 14. 
45 Cf. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., You Say You Want a Revolution?  The Case Against the 
Transformation of Culture Through Antidiscrimination Laws, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1588 
(1997). 
46 KOPPELMAN, supra note 36, at 2. 
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 I should be a bit more specific about what the conception of 
social equality demands.  Most centrally, it demands what 
Professor Walzer calls “complex equality.” 47   It demands that 
inequalities in economic position (which may be beneficial or 
inevitable) not be automatically replicated into inequalities in other 
areas of life that are key to participation in society.  Professor David 
Miller puts the point this way: 
[Social equality] does not require that people should be 
equal in power, prestige or wealth, nor, absurdly, that they 
should score the same on natural dimensions such as 
strength or intelligence. What matters is how such 
differences are regarded, and in particular whether they 
serve to construct a social hierarchy in which A can 
unequivocally be ranked as B’s superior. Where there is 
social equality, people feel that each member of the 
community enjoys an equal standing with all the rest that 
overrides their unequal ratings along particular 
dimensions.48 
In this respect, arguments about what social equality requires 
overlap with arguments made by those theorists who are skeptical 
of certain forms of commodification.  Professor Debra Satz, for 
example, argues that commodification of a human activity is 
problematic if it leads to “outcomes that undermine the conditions 
for citizens to interact as equals.”49  Professors Elizabeth Anderson 
and Peggy Radin, too, have expressed concern with the way 
commodification of certain activities (notably sex and parenthood) 
can undermine social equality.50  
 Theorists of social equality have identified certain areas of 
life in which financial inequalities should not be allowed to 
replicate themselves (in other words, in which commodification 
should be limited or barred).  One involves activities of democratic 
participation and access to the government.  As Professor Anderson 
                                                 
47 E.g., WALZER, supra note 9, at 3-30.  
48 Miller, supra note 9, at 232. 
49 See, for example, Chapter 4 of DEBRA SATZ, WHY SOME THINGS SHOULD NOT BE 
FOR SALE: THE MORAL LIMITS OF MARKETS (2010). 
50  See ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 154, 168-189 
(1993); MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 131-153 (1996).  Note 
that both Professor Anderson and Professor Radin frame their arguments in 
terms of commodification undermining the intrinsic value of the activity.  In this 
sense their arguments resemble those of Professor Michael Sandel.  See SANDEL, 
supra note 34.  But for Professors Anderson and Radin, at least, the social-
equality concerns lie fairly close to the surface of their arguments. 
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argues, equals are “free to participate in politics and the major 
institutions of civil society,” so the equal ability “to participate in 
democratic self-government” is a key part of “liv[ing] in an 
egalitarian community.” 51   Along those lines, Professor Walzer 
identifies the following as among the social goods that 
presumptively may not be commodified: political power and 
influence; basic political freedoms, obligations, and offices; and 
basic governmental services.52  Social equality is threatened when 
inequalities of wealth, income, or position are leveraged into 
inequalities of access to the political process, community self-
government, the process of petitioning for redress of grievances, 
and the protections of the law. 53   In this regard, as Professor 
Solomon has emphasized, the opportunity to call someone to 
account before a neutral tribunal for violation of one’s rights is a 
central element of being a full and equal member of our society.54 
 But social equality matters outside of the context of 
democratic and civic participation as well.  In particular, where 
inequalities of wealth, income, or position translate into hierarchies 
of status—in which “one person is treated as a superior and 
another as an inferior” in some general sense—social equality is 
threatened. 55   To some extent, the concern here is one of 
domination and subordination.  As Professor Anderson argues, 
“[e]quals are not dominated by others; they do not live at the mercy 
of others’ wills.” 56   This anti-domination concern also finds 
expression in the American Republican tradition that informed the 
adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment. 57   One problem with 
domination is that a subordinate individual in such a relationship 
                                                 
51 Anderson, supra note 9, at 315. 
52 WALZER, supra note 9, at 100-103; see also Don Herzog, How to Think About 
Equality, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1621, 1633 (2002) (arguing that political power should 
not be commodified). 
53 See DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE, supra note 32, at 366 (arguing that “[c]itizen 
equality” requires “that different groups of citizens not be disadvantaged, in 
their effort to gain attention and respect for their views, by a circumstance so 
remote from the substance of opinion or argument, or from the legitimate 
sources of influence, as wealth is”). 
54 See Solomon, supra note 9, at 252-253.  It is hardly surprising that in the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866, our Nation’s first Reconstruction-Era civil rights statute, the 
right “to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all 
laws and proceedings for the security of persons or property” receives explicit 
protection against discrimination.  42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). 
55 Fourie, supra note 9, at 111. 
56 Anderson, supra note 9, at 315. 
57 See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 35. 
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must often submit to humiliating and degrading rituals—such as 
literally or figuratively engaging in the sort of “[b]owing and 
scraping” that Kant argued was “unworthy of a human being.”58   
We might legitimately fear that such domination is afoot 
when one person, because of his or her wealth, can induce another 
person with less wealth to give up the sorts of activities or 
commitments that Professor Radin labels as “integral to the self” or 
especially bound up with “personhood.”59  Even independent of 
domination, we might be especially concerned that social equality 
is threatened when one class of people—defined by wealth or 
income—systematically gives up the choice to engage in those 
activities that are especially important to defining and 
understanding the self.60 
 One particular threat to social equality is the phenomenon of 
asymmetric vulnerability.  Where one individual is especially 
vulnerable to the exercise of another’s economic power, and the 
vulnerability is not reciprocated, it will be easier for the less 
vulnerable person to establish a relationship of domination over the 
more vulnerable one.  Asymmetric vulnerability is a particular 
concern in employment markets—especially in times of high 
unemployment.  For an individual worker, having and keeping a 
job is supremely important.  For the employer, by contrast, 
individual employees are often replaceable or even fungible.  For 
the worker, the loss of a job can lead to the loss of the means of 
making a living and of obtaining respect from self and 
community.61  Where jobs are scarce, a worker might be willing to 
subordinate herself in all sorts of ways to ensure that she doesn’t 
                                                 
58 IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 188 (Mary Gregor, ed. 1996) 
(originally published 1797).  For an effort to draw a connection between 
employment law and Kant’s argument on this point, see Matthew W. Finkin, 
Menschenbild: The Conception of the Employee as a Person in Western Law, 23 COMP. 
LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 577, 607 (2002). 
59 RADIN, supra note 50, at 56. 
60 There is, of course, a real question of paternalism here, which I discuss in the 
next section. 
61 See Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting 
the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1405-1406, 1413-
1415 (1967) (discussing harm to workers of losing a job); Marion Crain, Arm’s-
Length Intimacy: Employment as Relationship, 35 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 163, 165-166 
(2011) (same).  On the importance of work to workers’ equal-citizenship status, 
see Forbath, supra note 9, at 16-17; Kenneth L. Karst, The Coming Crisis of Work in 
Constitutional Perspective, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 523 (1997). 
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lose hers. 62   As I show in Part II, the employment relation is 
therefore a central arena in the battle for social equality. 
C.  The Limitations of the Principle 
 To end all social inequality is a goal that is beyond the reach 
of employment law—and likely of law itself.  Even if law could 
achieve that goal, a thoroughgoing effort to use law to eliminate 
social inequality root and branch would likely require such 
intrusive interventions as to violate other basic principles of our 
liberal state. 63   But my argument is not that the law should 
eliminate all sources of social inequality.  It is far more modest.  I 
contend that employment practices are particularly likely to 
implicate issues of social equality and that, when they do so, the 
law should presumptively regulate those practices to remove the 
most significant threats to that goal.  Social equality is not an 
absolute goal that the law should pursue though the heavens may 
fall.  Legal rules must take account of the extent and incidence of 
costs they impose, as well as of other values that should limit their 
application.64 
 Most obviously, employment law rules should not generally 
prevent employers from engaging in remunerative business.  The 
goal of employment law, as I see it, is not to prevent employers 
from engaging in managerial or entrepreneurial decisionmaking.  
Rather, it is to regulate those aspects of employer prerogative that 
impose significant threats to social equality without sufficient 
countervailing benefits to society.  Managers and owners are 
typically in the best position to determine what workplace 
arrangements maximize profitability.  And, in general, an increase 
in profits leads to an increase in the pool of material goods 
available to the workers in the enterprise and to growth in the 
economy (which itself benefits workers).65  The degree to which 
                                                 
62 Cf. Jennifer Gordon & R.A. Lenhardt, Rethinking Work and Citizenship, 55 UCLA 
L. REV. 1161, 1220-1222 (2008) (arguing that, for many Latino immigrants, the 
need to keep a job in the United States makes them “reluctant to turn down jobs 
or to complain about work conditions,” while many African-Americans working 
in low-wage jobs “seek to exercise some control over the terms and pace of the 
work in which they engage” so that they may “ensure a modicum of dignity and 
respect”). 
63 See Hills, supra note 45. 
64 See Bagenstos, supra note 8, at 921. 
65 Of course, the share that workers can obtain depends on the bargaining power 
of the parties—which itself depends on legal rules such as support for collective 
bargaining—as well as on the political feasibility of other redistributive policies 
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employment-law rules advance social equality must necessarily be 
weighed against the degree to which those rules limit profitability 
and economic growth. 
 Some employer actions may be gratuitously abusive.  An 
example from employment discrimination law may be sexual 
harassment.  The analog in the case of individual employment law 
might be a particularly intrusive invasion of a worker’s privacy.  
Actions like these threaten social equality without enhancing the 
bottom line of the enterprise.  We can force employers to abandon 
these sorts of practices without imposing any monetary cost.  
Indeed, if doing so makes it easier to attract and retain skilled 
workers, an employer might actually realize a monetary benefit by 
abandoning abusive practices.66  To be sure, the supervisor will 
have to bear the cost of foregoing the utility that she presumably 
obtains from engaging in abusive conduct.  But we can properly 
ignore that utility loss as stemming from illegitimate preferences.67 
 Even where it imposes some monetary cost, interference 
with employer prerogatives in the service of social equality is still 
justified.  As Professor Matt Finkin notes, employment-law rules 
that impose costs on employers to serve societal interests are 
ubiquitous.68  The argument supporting these rules again parallels 
the argument for prohibiting rational discrimination.  Social 
inequality is an important social harm, and the employer is in the 
best position to avoid entrenching and reinforcing that harm.  An 
employer that puts the interest in obtaining the absolute maximum 
profit ahead of its obligation to avoid contributing to that social 
harm is acting in a morally objectionable manner—one for which it 
is fair to hold the employer accountable. 
                                                                                                                         
by government.  There is an important role for redistributive policies, but they 
largely lie outside of individual employment law. 
66 One might question whether it is necessary for the law to step in to force 
employers to do something that benefits them.  In a perfectly competitive market 
employers who engage in abusive practices that make it difficult to attract skilled 
workers will be driven out of business.  But markets are not perfectly 
competitive, and they can take a long time to drive out abusive and inefficient 
practices.  Cf. John J. Donohue III, Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1411 
(1986) (arguing that, even if the market would eventually drive discriminating 
employers out of business, Title VII accelerates our arrival at that efficient long-
run equilibrium). 
67 This is an application of the notion of “laundering” preferences; the discussion 
in text glosses over the complications of this notion.  See Bagenstos, supra note 8, 
at 881-883. 
68 See Matthew W. Finkin, Life Away From Work, 66 LA. L. REV. 945 (2006). 
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 Employment discrimination law uses two principal 
techniques to determine when it is too costly to impose on 
employers an obligation to avoid contributing to inequality.  The 
first is domain restriction.  Thus, the law does not permit 
employers any defense for intentional race discrimination against 
minorities—even if the discrimination is bottom-line rational. 69  
That rule may be explained at least in part as reflecting the 
conclusion that forbearing from racial discrimination is rarely likely 
to impose heavy costs on a particular employer—especially if all 
other employers are required to forbear as well.  Particularly where 
it is the preferences of biased customers or coworkers that make 
discrimination rational for an employer, we are willing to impose 
on employers a short-term cost of increased friction in the 
workplace to achieve a long-term equilibrium in which those 
preferences go away (or at least may not be consequential in any 
workplace). 
 For sex discrimination, by contrast, rational discrimination is 
permissible if it is a “bona fide occupational qualification” (BFOQ) 
for the position in question.70  This rule reflects, in part, a judgment 
that forgoing sex discrimination will sometimes impose intolerable 
costs on employers, at least in two sorts of cases: (1) cases in which 
an entire line of business is necessarily and not merely contingently 
built on sex differences (a line that cannot be drawn without 
making normative judgments); or (2) cases in which customer 
preferences to be served by a member of a particular sex rest on 
concerns about gender privacy that our society is still willing to 
endorse.71 
 The second technique employment discrimination law 
employs is straightforward balancing.  Thus, in cases in which an 
individual’s disability is incompatible with the way a job is 
currently structured, courts will ask whether there is any 
“reasonable accommodation” that will enable the individual to 
perform “essential functions” of the job without imposing “undue 
hardship” on the employer.72  In the case of employment practices 
                                                 
69 See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 8, at 851-852 (discussing Title VII’s prohibition of 
even rational intentional discrimination); Russell K. Robinson, Casting and Caste-
ing: Reconciling Artistic Freedom and Antidiscrimination Norms, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1, 40 
(2007) (“On its face, Title VII provides no BFOQ defense for race.”). 
70 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e). 
71 For a good discussion of the cases in this area, see Kimberly A. Yuracko, Private 
Nurses and Playboy Bunnies: Explaining Permissible Sex Discrimination, 92 CAL. L. 
REV. 147 (2004). 
72 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(8), 12112(b)(5)(A) (emphasis added). 
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that are alleged to violate Title VII or the ADA because they have a 
disparate impact, the law asks whether the practice is “job-related” 
and “consistent with business necessity.”73 
Unlike in the context of intentional race and sex 
discrimination, the law of reasonable accommodation and 
disparate impact asks courts to engage in a more overt balancing of 
interests.  But in all of these areas, the law filters the consideration 
of costs through its definition of the job at issue.  Crucially, the law 
requires courts (with more or less deference to the employer’s 
views) to make their own independent determinations of what the 
job consists of. 74   Because of the interest in avoiding social 
inequality, the law takes away a bit of the employer’s managerial 
prerogative to define the nature of the job.  And the law takes away 
that prerogative even when doing so will impose costs on 
employers. 
As I will show in Part II, these techniques have lessons for 
individual employment law.  Employment law can sometimes limit 
the costs it imposes on employers through domain restriction.  For 
example, I argue below that—except where certain categories of 
employees are concerned—employers should be categorically 
barred from regulating the off-the-job speech or conduct of their 
workers.  Such a rule will doubtless impose costs on employers 
who have legitimate bottom-line-oriented reasons for concern 
about their employees’ off-the-job conduct.  But the costs to the 
employers are likely to be much less—and the benefits for social 
equality much greater—when an employer is barred from 
regulating off-the-job conduct than when it is barred from 
regulating on-the-job conduct.  Other times, individual 
employment law will do best by weighing employer costs directly 
in each case.  An example here might be the law involving 
employee privacy within the workplace. 
As in the employment discrimination context, the definition 
of the employee’s job will be a crucial fulcrum of evaluation.  And 
just as in the employment discrimination context, an employer 
cannot be permitted absolute prerogative to define the job—even 
when it has financial interests in doing so.  A coal company may 
                                                 
73 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i), 12112(b)(6). 
74 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (providing that “consideration shall be given to the 
employer’s judgment as to what functions of a job are essential, and if an 
employer has prepared a written description before advertising or interviewing 
applicants for the job, this description shall be considered evidence of the essential 
functions of the job”) (emphasis added). 
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have an interest in ensuring that its employees contribute to 
Republicans, if Republicans are likely to support a regulatory 
environment that aids the company’s bottom line.  But to allow the 
company to define a miner’s job as extracting coal from the ground 
plus writing checks to Republican candidates would allow the 
company to leverage its economic power over employees into 
additional political power—a direct threat to social equality.  Just as 
in the employment discrimination setting, the law should provide a 
check on the employer’s definition of job tasks. 
Individual employment law does seem—at least at first 
glance—to implicate at least one concern that lacks a parallel in 
employment discrimination law.  That is a concern about 
paternalism.  Employment law imposes terms on the employment 
relationship that the parties would otherwise be legally free to 
adopt themselves if they so chose.  Orthodox economic theory 
would tell us that when employees do not insist on including a 
given term, that indicates that they value that term less than 
whatever they were getting in exchange for it.  To require 
employers to provide that term in such circumstances—at least 
where the employer is free to take away something else in 
exchange for including the mandatory term—will therefore make 
the employee worse off—according to her own preferences—than 
she would be in the absence of the mandate.75 
There are all sorts of reasons, even from within economic 
theory, to believe that this orthodox account fails in a wide range of 
cases to accurately describe the effects of employment law 
mandates.76  But that account clearly offers an accurate description 
                                                 
75 For arguments to this effect, see Epstein, supra note 4; Morriss, supra note 4.  
Law-and-economics types are not the only ones concerned about this problem.  
This concern with the possibly perverse effects of banning problematic 
commodification is a central aspect of Professor Radin’s writing, see RADIN, supra 
note 50, at 123-130, and the writing of other feminist scholars, see Joan C. 
Williams & Viviana A. Zelizer, To Commodify or Not to Commodify: That is Not the 
Question, in RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READINGS IN LAW AND 
CULTURE 362 (Martha M. Ertman & Joan C. Williams, eds., 2005). 
76 Professor Willborn offers a number of reasons, from within economic theory, 
why mandatory terms might make workers better off.  See Steven L. Willborn, 
Individual Employment Rights and the Standard Economic Objection: Theory and 
Empiricism, 67 NEB. L. REV. 101 (1988).  For arguments focused on employees’ 
lack of full information, see sources cited infra note 90.  For arguments, rooted in 
economic theory, that the effects of mandatory employment terms will depend 
on the respective value of those terms to employers and employees, and on the 
heterogeneity of employees’ preferences, see Christine Jolls, Accommodation 
Mandates, 53 STAN. L. REV. 223 (2000); Lawrence H. Summers, Some Simple 
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at least some of the time.  A social equality approach helps to show 
why that is nonetheless not a decisive argument against imposing 
mandatory terms through employment law.  The imposition of 
mandatory employment terms may force some workers to accept 
deals that do not optimally satisfy their preferences, but a social 
equality model posits that the goal of employment law is not the 
satisfaction of individual employees’ preferences.  Rather, the goal 
is a systemic one—to prevent and eliminate significant threats to 
social equality.  In this respect, again, individual employment law 
is analogous to employment discrimination law.  Even if some 
employees would be better off without antidiscrimination 
protections, that cost is nonetheless justified because the body of 
law disentrenches segregation and subordination. 
None of this is to say that the costs imposed on individual 
workers are irrelevant to an assessment of employment law rules, 
even under a social equality theory.  If those rules significantly 
increase unemployment, for example, there would be a strong basis 
to argue against such rules—not least because increased 
unemployment itself undermines social equality.77  And where, as 
Professor Julie Suk shows regarding France’s highly rigid 
employment-law system, the disemployment effects fall especially 
heavily on already stigmatized and segregated social groups, social 
equality provides a doubly strong basis to criticize them. 78  
Whether any of the particular rules I discuss in Part II will lead to 
such effects requires serious empirical analysis.  But each of those 
rules seems quite far from imposing the sorts of dislocations that 
the French system has—and those rules can be designed to 
minimize the risk of that result. 
II.  DOCTRINAL IMPLICATIONS 
 In this Part, I sketch some possible doctrinal applications of a 
social equality theory of individual employment law.  As I hope to 
show, a social-equality focus has implications for a wide array of 
employment-law rules.  In some doctrinal areas, such a focus 
suggests quite significant changes in current rules; in others, it 
suggests milder tweaks or extensions; and in still others it suggests 
that current rules have it about right.  But my goal in this Part is not 
to make a comprehensive case for any particular reform or defense 
                                                                                                                         
Economics of Mandated Benefits, 79 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS 177 
(1989). 
77 On the importance of work to social equality, see sources cited supra note 61. 
78  See Julie C. Suk, Discrimination at Will: Job Security Protections and Equal 
Employment Opportunity in Conflict, 60 STAN. L. REV. 73 (2007). 
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of any particular rule.  Any such case must engage in depth with 
the specific considerations at play in a particular rule choice.  
Although I offer some suggestions in that direction, my goal in this 
part is narrower: first, to show how employment law rules 
pervasively implicate questions of social equality; and second, to 
suggest that a focus on those questions can enrich our analysis—
and sharpen our critiques and defenses—of those rules.   
In Section A, I argue that a social equality approach supports 
longstanding critiques of the employment-at-will rule.  That rule is 
the most debated principle of employment law, and I cannot hope 
(and do not attempt) to resolve the debate.  Rather, I attempt to 
show that classic challenges to employment-at-will rest on an 
inchoate version of the social equality approach I articulate in this 
paper.  The debate over the rule thus provides an apt first 
illustration of my argument.  In Section B, I argue that social 
equality also demands legal rules that generally respect worker 
privacy—and I show how a social equality approach helps us 
elaborate those rules. 
In Section C, I argue that a social equality approach suggests 
that the law should limit private employers’ ability to regulate the 
political speech of their employees.  I discuss this question more 
extensively than I do the other doctrinal areas in this part, because 
regulation of workers’ political speech is currently an important 
area of discussion in employment law and because considering that 
area highlights the ways in which a social equality approach can 
accommodate employer interests.  Section D extends this 
discussion to anti-retaliation and whistleblower protection statutes.  
Section E discusses the (ambiguous) implications of a social 
equality approach for the rise of mandatory employment 
arbitration.  And Section F shows how social equality ideas 
underlie limitations on child labor as well as maximum-hours laws. 
For many of the doctrines I discuss, hints of social equality 
arguments appear in the scholarly, judicial, and political discourse.  
For others, social equality may appear to be more of a novel 
justification.  In all events, I contend that social equality is a useful 
concept in understanding and critiquing individual employment 
law. 
A.  The Employment-at-Will Rule 
 A core aspect of social equality is what de Beauvoir 
described as “’human relations in daily life [being] on a footing of 
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equality.’”79  Precisely because work is central to most people’s 
day-to-day lives, the legal rules governing the employment 
relationship can have a significant effect on the equality or 
inequality of these social relations.  In particular, given the 
disproportionate power owners and supervisors often have over 
their workers, the workplace continually threatens to create and 
entrench hierarchies of status.  Employment law can help to 
undermine these hierarchies.  But too often it fails to meet this 
potential, and it bolsters those hierarchies instead.  The strong 
default rule of employment at will is a prime example. 
The most significant source of workplace hierarchy is the 
boss’s power to fire.  Under the baseline employment-at-will rule 
that continues to prevail in all American jurisdictions but 
Montana,80 an employer can terminate an employee for a good 
reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all—unless the employer’s 
reason is specifically forbidden by some external source of law such 
as an antidiscrimination statute.  And even when the employer 
does act for a forbidden reason, the at-will rule will make it difficult 
as a practical matter for the employee to prove it, because that rule 
facilitates employers’ assertion of pretextual reasons for 
termination. 81   Although the rights of the employer and the 
employee to terminate the relationship at will are formally 
symmetrical, a worker often needs a particular job more than the 
employer needs a particular worker.  This is especially true in times 
of high unemployment.   
The at-will rule therefore gives bosses ample power to 
require employees to engage in the “bowing and scraping, fawning 
and toadying”82 that is the bête noire of social equality.  Professors 
Chris Bertram, Corey Robin, and Alex Gourevitch argue that the at-
will rule makes it “difficult to conceive of a less free institution for 
adults than the average workplace,” where “[o]n pain of being 
fired,” workers “can be commanded to pee or forbidden to pee”; 
can be “forbidden to wear what they want, say what they want 
(and at what decibel), and associate with whom they want”; and 
                                                 
79 See Karst, supra note 9, at 11 (quoting DE BEAUVOIR, supra note 28, at 261) 
80 See MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-901 et seq.; Arnow-Richman, supra note 4, at 4 n.9 
(stating that “employment at will is the established law in every state except 
Montana, which has modified the default rule by statute”). 
81 See Cynthia L. Estlund, Wrongful Discharge Protections in an At-Will World, 74 
TEX. L. REV. 1655 (1995); Joseph E. Slater, The “American Rule” That Swallows the 
Exceptions, 11 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 53 (2007). 
82 WALZER, supra note 9, at xiii. 
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“can be fired for donating a kidney to their boss (fired by the same 
boss, that is), refusing to have their person or effects searched, 
calling the boss a ‘cheapskate’ in a personal letter, and more.”83  As 
Professor Bagchi contends, practices like these demonstrate—and 
enact—social status hierarchies within the workplace.84 
These sorts of practices seem abusive and arbitrary in many 
cases.  Arguments against employment at will often focus on this 
sort of employer abuse or arbitrariness and on the “morally 
reprehensible employer motives” that may underlie it.85  But just as 
I have argued in the employment discrimination context, motive or 
malice ought not to be the crucial factor in determining whether the 
law should regulate an employer’s conduct.  The problem is not 
simply that individual employees will have no remedy for the 
abusive acts of their bosses.  Rather, a social equality perspective 
suggests that the problem rests in the entire system of social 
relations that the at-will rule engenders.   
Some of the classic critiques of employment-at-will focus on 
these sorts of systemic effects.  They thus rest on at least an 
inchoate version of a social equality approach.  Dean Lawrence 
Blades, for example, captured the crucial point in his critique.  
Because employment-at-will effectively “forces the non-union 
employee to rely on the whim of his employer for preservation of 
his livelihood,” Blades argued, it “tends to make him a docile 
follower of his employer’s every wish.”86  A worker who knows she 
can be terminated for virtually any reason will submit to any 
number of degradations, and supervisors will be tempted to force 
her to do so.  The result is to entrench a hierarchy within the 
workplace, in which a boss’s dominion over the worker goes 
beyond what simply serves the productive mission of the 
workplace and potentially extends to any aspect of the worker’s 
life.  As Professor Clyde Summers argued, the social relations 
engendered by the at-will rule reflect a “deeply rooted conception 
of the employment relation as a dominant-servient relation”—in 
                                                 
83 Chris Bertram, Corey Robin & Alex Gourevitch, Let it Bleed: Libertarianism and 
the Workplace, http://crookedtimber.org/2012/07/01/let-it-bleed-libertarianism-
and-the-workplace/ (July 1, 2012). 
84 See Bagchi, supra note 16, at 591. 
85 Arnow-Richman, supra note 4, at 10 (arguing that many advocates of just-cause 
protections have “presented at-will employment as enabling arbitrary, malicious, 
and even socially harmful employer behavior,” and that the opposition to 
employment-at-will has been based on “the condemnation of morally 
reprehensible employer motives”). 
86 Blades, supra note 61, at 1405. 
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which “[t]he employer is sovereign over his or her employee 
subjects”—“rather than one of mutual rights and obligations.”87 A 
relationship in which one party is so subject to the whims of the 
other is not a relationship of equality and mutual respect.88  
Defenders of employment-at-will make two basic arguments 
against abandonment of the rule.  First, they argue that, because it 
is merely a default rule, employers and employees are free to 
contract around it.  If employees have not sought just-cause 
protection in their employment contracts, these defenders contend, 
that indicates that employees value those protections less than they 
value whatever they receive from employers in exchange for giving 
them up. 89   This argument is substantially undermined by the 
findings that workers often assume that they cannot be discharged 
arbitrarily, even when the law in fact provides them no such 
protection.90 
The second argument in defense of employment-at-will 
involves employer cost.  A just-cause regime, defenders of the at-
will relationship argue, imposes significant costs on employers by 
making it too difficult to discipline shirking employees—and 
entangling them in costly litigation when they attempt to do so.91  
As I argued in Part I.C., this is an entirely appropriate matter to 
consider in framing employment-law rules.  Yet key proposals to 
replace employment-at-will already take account of this 
consideration.  As I suggested in Part I.C., one way they do this is 
                                                 
87 Clyde W. Summers, Employment at Will in the United States: The Divine Right of 
Employers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65, 78 (2000). 
88 See Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 
779, 791 (1994) (suggesting that critics of the employment-at-will rule invoke 
“notions of equality” (or “civic equality and respect”) when they “claim that the 
rule reflects an inadequate kind of valuation of workers because it subjects them 
to the whim of employers”). 
89 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 4, at 953-956; J. Hoult Verkerke, An Empirical 
Perspective on Indefinite Term Employment Contracts: Resolving the Just Cause Debate, 
1995 WIS. L. REV. 837. 
90 See RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT 118-121 (1999); 
Cynthia L. Estlund, How Wrong Are Employees About Their Rights, and Why Does It 
Matter?, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 6 (2002); Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining With Imperfect 
Information: A Study of Worker Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 
CORNELL L. REV. 105 (1997); Pauline T. Kim, Norms, Learning, and Law: Exploring 
the Influences on Workers’ Legal Knowledge, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 447; Jesse Rudy, 
What They Don’t Know Won’t Hurt Them: Defending Employment-at-Will in Light of 
Findings That Employees Believe They Possess Just Cause Protection, 23 BERKELEY J. 
EMP. & LAB. L. 307, 317-338 (2002). 
91  See Epstein, supra note 4, at 964-966; Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice: 
Accommodating Just Cause and Employment at Will, 92 MICH. L. REV. 8 (1993). 
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by giving employers significant leeway in determining what sort of 
performance the worker’s job requires.  The Model Employment 
Termination Act, for example, defines the “good cause” necessary 
for termination in a manner that is quite deferential to employers’ 
interests in defining what is necessary job performance.92  It would 
not even apply this good-cause requirement until an employee has 
worked for an employer for at least a year; during the one-year 
probationary period, the at-will rule would continue to prevail.93  
And it provides that the good-cause standard would be enforced in 
relatively streamlined arbitration proceedings.94 
The Model Employment Termination Act has drawn 
criticism from both the employer and the employee perspective.95  
There is no need, for present purposes, to endorse or reject the 
precise compromise it draws.  The crucial points are these:  First, 
the longstanding challenges to employment-at-will draw support 
from (and at times have rested on arguments indistinguishable 
from) the social equality approach I defend in this paper.  Second, 
as my argument demands, legislation overturning employment-at-
will can strike at the doctrine’s most significant threats to social 
equality without imposing undue costs on particular employers. 
B.  Worker Privacy 
The at-will rule does not just enable individual bosses or 
supervisors to engage in arbitrary or abusive conduct.  It also 
enables employers to adopt policies that intrude on what are 
generally understood to be the “private” lives of workers.96  The 
concept of privacy is notoriously broad.  As Professor Pauline Kim 
notes, it “has been invoked to protect a variety of distinct interests 
in the workplace,” including workers’ “bodily integrity,” their 
interest in “avoiding intrusion on physical spaces,” their property 
interest in their “personal items,” their interest in “preventing 
disclosure of personal information,” and more general interests in 
                                                 
92 See Theodore J. St. Antoine, The Making of the Model Employment Termination 
Act, 69 WASH. L. REV. 361, 371-372 (1994). 
93 See id. at 372. 
94 See id. at 376-379; see also William B. Gould IV, The Idea of the Job as Property in 
Contemporary America: The Legal and Collective Bargaining Framework, 1986 BYU L. 
REV. 885, 908 (arguing that “[t]he first basic ingredient” in just-cause legislation 
“should be arbitration, its virtues being speed, economy, and informality”). 
95 See, e.g., Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A 
Historical Review and Critical Assessment, 43 B.C. L. REV. 351, 426-427 (2002). 
96 See Pauline T. Kim, Privacy Rights, Public Policy, and the Employment Relationship, 
57 OHIO ST. L.J. 671, 676 (1996) (arguing that “any meaningful protection of 
employee privacy requires limitation of an employer’s power to fire at will.”). 
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“individual autonomy.”97  Under the privacy rubric, workers have 
challenged employers’ regulation of out-of-work activity—like 
dating, smoking, and volunteering at a worker’s chosen charity—as 
well as employers’ at-work intrusions on their bodies, effects, or 
personal spaces.98  Some of these challenges have been successful; 
many have not. 
These privacy claims are often understood as invoking a 
purely individualistic interest in liberty, autonomy, or dignity.99  
But they also quite directly implicate social equality.  Privacy 
norms do more than protect individual liberty or autonomy.  They 
also mark a person’s status as a full member of the community.  As 
the philosopher Jeffrey Reiman argued nearly four decades ago, 
“[p]rivacy is an essential part of the complex social practice by 
means of which the group recognizes—and communicates to the 
individual—that his existence is his own.” 100   To deny certain 
persons or classes of persons the privacy normally accorded to 
others is therefore to deny them “the respect normally accorded to 
full-fledged members of the community.”101 
That employee privacy cases implicate social equality thus 
seems fairly clear.  How a social equality perspective should alter 
the resolution of those cases is less clear.  Where there is a broad 
social consensus supporting certain aspects of privacy, a boss who 
denies a worker those aspects of privacy does seem to be asserting 
“the employer’s higher status and the employee’s 
subordination.” 102   Searches of one’s purse or one’s body, or 
regulations of what workers do in their own homes or on their own 
                                                 
97 Pauline T. Kim, Electronic Privacy and Employee Speech, 87 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 901, 
901 (2012). 
98 For a general treatment of these issues, see MATTHEW W. FINKIN, PRIVACY IN 
EMPLOYMENT LAW (3d ed. 2009). 
99 For a good recent example of this attitude, see Steven L. Willborn, Consenting 
Employees, 66 LA. L. REV. 975 (2006). 
100 Jeffrey H. Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 26, 39 
(1976). 
101 Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the 
Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REV. 957, 968 (1989); see also Kim, supra note 96, at 
692 (common-law privacy torts are concerned with those violations “which 
threaten an individual’s identity by withdrawing the deference normally 
afforded a member of the community”); Robert C. Post, Three Concepts of Privacy, 
89 GEO. L.J. 2087, 2092 (2001) (“To equate privacy with dignity is to ground 
privacy in social forms of respect we owe each other as members of a common 
community.”). 
102  Catherine L. Fisk, Privacy, Power, and Humiliation at Work: Re-Examining 
Appearance Regulation as an Invasion of Privacy, 66 LA. L. REV. 1111, 1120 (2006). 
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time, seem to violate these common understandings of privacy.  
Accordingly, a social equality approach can applaud the common-
law analysis applied in many states—an analysis that focuses on 
expectations of privacy and typically is skeptical of bodily 
intrusions and searches of personal items.103  It can also applaud 
the statues in many jurisdictions that prohibit employers from 
taking adverse action on the basis of their employees’ lawful out-of-
work activities.104 
But the conventionalist nature of this approach seems 
problematic. 105   A conventionalist approach can rein in outlier 
employers—those who are acting in a manner inconsistent with 
what are then-widespread social norms—but it cannot protect 
against changes in social norms generally.  As ongoing changes to 
the organization of work blur the boundaries between “work time” 
and “non-work time,” and as employers are increasingly conscious 
of the contribution of out-of-work activities to employees’ health 
insurance costs, current norms may change.106  Moreover, these 
social norms may themselves be affected by what the law permits 
or prohibits.  Because statutory and common law permitted so 
many employers to test their employees for drug use, for example, 
that practice became sufficiently widespread in the 1980s and 1990s 
that there is substantially less of a social norm against submission 
to urinalysis than there was 30 years ago.107  On the flip side, public 
attitudes toward cigarette smoking have rapidly evolved in such a 
negative direction that it is plausible that employers’ prohibition of 
employees’ out-of-work smoking could become equally 
normalized—but for the widespread passage of statutes protecting 
                                                 
103 For a good recent summary, see Kim, supra note 97, at 905-908. 
104 For a recent (critical) summary of these statutes, see M. Todd Henderson, The 
Nanny Corporation, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1517, 1591-1595 (2009). 
105  This, of course, is a longstanding problem with privacy law.  See Mark 
Tushnet, Legal Conventionalism in the U.S. Constitutional Law of Privacy, 17 SOCIAL 
PHIL. & POL’Y 141 (2000). 
106 See Kim, supra note 97, at 908-914; Henderson, supra note 104, at 1528-1530; 
James A. Sonne, Monitoring for Quality Assurance: Employer Regulation of Off-Duty 
Behavior, 43 GA. L. REV. 133, 146-153 (2008).  These norms were very much 
contested in the negotiations surrounding the wellness provisions of the 
Affordable Care Act, which ultimately gave employers more power than they 
previously held to financially incentivize healthy conduct by their employees.  
See JOHN E. MCDONOUGH, INSIDE NATIONAL HEALTH REFORM 191-194 (2011). 
107 For a good discussion of the expansion of workplace drug testing, and the 
legal response to it, see Pauline T. Kim, Collective and Individual Approaches to 
Protecting Employee Privacy: The Experience with Workplace Drug Testing, 66 LA. L. 
REV. 1009 (2006). 
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workers’ lawful off-duty conduct.  Because social norms about 
privacy are in part endogenous to law, those norms appear to 
provide no independent basis for determining what the law should 
permit or prohibit. 
These points demonstrate that workplace privacy 
protections cannot be purely conventionalist.  A social equality 
perspective cannot precisely answer the question of where to draw 
the line of privacy protection, but it does suggest three points that 
may help guide the search for answers.  First, simply because an 
employer may have a financial interest in regulating an employee’s 
conduct outside of the workplace or working hours, that does not 
imply that the law should permit the employer to define the job as 
including compliance with regulations of such conduct.  As I noted 
above, employment discrimination law limits employers’ ability to 
define their employees’ jobs in ways that threaten significant 
equality interests—even if the employer would realize a financial 
benefit by defining the job in such ways.108  Southwest Airlines may 
profit by requiring its flight attendants to be female sex objects for a 
predominantly male business-traveler clientele, but the law 
prohibits it from doing so.109  The threat to gender equality of 
employers adopting such policies is too great, and the cost to the 
airline of abandoning such a policy is sufficiently small, to justify a 
prohibition.   
An analogous point applies to off-work activities.  The 
opportunity to choose one’s own recreational and avocational 
activities is a key part of what it means to be a full member of our 
society.  Those are often the activities in which individuals develop 
their sense of personal identity and their ties with like-minded 
people in the community.  To allow an employer to use its 
economic power over an employee to regulate those activities 
threatens social equality.  To be sure, an employer may experience 
some increase in health-care costs if its employees engage in risky 
activities.  Or it may experience some reputational costs if its 
employees engage in controversial activities.110  But the cost in the 
                                                 
108 See supra Part I.C. 
109  See Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981) 
(rejecting claim that “femininity, or more accurately female sex appeal,” is a 
BFOQ for the job of flight attendant). 
110 Consider the recent example of Michael Brutsch, who was fired from his job at 
a financial services company after Gawker revealed that he was the individual, 
known on the Reddit website as “Violentacrez,” who “posted pictures and 
hosted discussions about dead teenage girls, rape, and anti-Semitism.”  Meredith 
Bennett-Smith, Reddit Troll Michael Brutsch Looks for Work in Porn, Tries to Put 
29
Bagenstos:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2013
 29
run of cases is unlikely to be so great as to justify the threat to social 
equality posed by allowing employers to regulate worker conduct 
outside of the workplace and outside of working hours. 111  
Exceptions to this principle might exist in those categories of cases 
in which the cost to the employer is likely to be especially large.  
These categories might include very high-level employees whose 
controversial actions are especially likely to be reasonably 
attributed to the employer, 112  or individuals with truly unique 
talents who could leave the employer in the lurch if they were 
injured while engaging in especially risky activities.113  
Second, certain privacy protections might be central to 
protecting other aspects of social equality—such as access to 
political and civic life.  Professor Kim, for example, argues that 
workers should be protected from employer surveillance of their 
communications in order to ensure that they have the space to 
develop and transmit ideas and information that are socially 
valued—particularly ideas and information regarding their 
employers’ violations of law. 114   A social equality perspective 
suggests that employees should be entitled to some such degree of 
protected space regardless of whether existing social norms 
promote it.115 
Finally, a social equality analysis can look to whether 
different classes of workers are treated differently.  If employers 
subject line workers to intrusions on their persons, their effects, or 
                                                                                                                         
“Jailbait” Experience to Use, HUFFINGTON POST, Oct. 24, 2012, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/24/reddit-troll-michael-brutsch-
looking-for-work-in-porn_n_2009815.html.  
111 See Michael Selmi, Privacy for the Working Class: Public Work and Private Lives, 
66 LA. L. REV. 1035 (2006) (arguing that employers should be sharply limited in 
their ability to regulate worker conduct off the job). 
112 Under such a rule, for example, the Cleveland Clinic could refuse to hire a 
smoker as a medical director but would be barred from refusing to hire a smoker 
to work on a loading dock.  Cf. A.G. Sulzberger, Hospitals Shift Smoking Bans to 
Smoker Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2011, at A1 (discussing Cleveland Clinic’s ban on 
hiring smokers). 
113  For example, a professional football team might prohibit its starting 
quarterback from riding a motorcycle without a helmet.  See Big Ben in Serious 
Condition After Motorcycle Accident, ESPN.COM, June 13, 2006, 
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=2480830.  
114 See Kim, supra note 97, at 925-931. 
115 Of course, an employer must have a means of protecting itself against criminal 
liability should an employee, for example, download child pornography on the 
employer’s computer.  But employers can serve that interest without intruding 
on all of an employee’s private communications. 
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their lives that go beyond the intrusions to which they subject 
supervisors and managers, that disparity suggests that the 
intrusions play a role in establishing or maintaining a hierarchy of 
status. 116   Absent a strong business reason for drawing the 
distinction—and, for the reasons I have discussed, business reasons 
should if anything point to greater intrusions on high-level 
employees—a social equality approach should look askance at such 
intrusions. 
Professor Todd Henderson is highly skeptical of laws that 
limit employers’ ability to regulate their employees’ off-work 
activities.  He asserts that employers do not engage in such 
regulation because of a desire to dominate their workers’ lives but 
simply because employers bear some of the costs of out-of-work 
choices.117  Where individuals do not bear the full costs of their 
conduct, Henderson contends, efforts by others to regulate that 
conduct will be “inevitable.” 118   The only question, he says, is 
whether private employers will regulate more efficiently than will 
the government.119  Because employers are disciplined by market 
constraints (in both the labor and the financial markets) in a way 
that the government is not, he posits that employers are often in the 
best position to force workers efficiently to internalize the costs of 
their activities.120 
Professor Henderson does not persuasively undermine the 
case for limiting employers’ ability to regulate off-work activities.  
For one thing, his entire argument is based on the premise, largely 
assumed but not proven, that market forces will ensure that such 
regulations serve only the interest in “economics, not 
domination.”121  But Henderson himself cites examples in which 
                                                 
116 Cf. Selmi, supra note 111, at 1051 (“Another way to obtain a reasonable balance 
between the interests of employers and employees with respect to medical 
screening would be to require employers to implement screening across-the-
board, to top executives as well as those at the bottom.  My sense is that many 
employers would shy away from genetic testing or other health screenings if 
they were also subject to the tests.”). 
117 See Henderson, supra note 104, at 1519. 
118 Id. at 1519. 
119 See id. at 1552 (“[T]he only relevant question is: who is the most efficient 
nanny?”). 
120 See id. at 1553-1558, 1561-1564. 
121 Id. at 1534.  Professor Henderson also argues that the law will constrain the 
most abusive exercises of employer power to regulate employees’ private lives—
an argument that seems to deprive him of any ground on which to stand in 
opposing laws designed to limit employer regulations that the political process 
deems abusive.  See id. at 1558-1559. 
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employers have sought to control aspects of workers’ home lives 
that would seem to have only the most tenuous relationship to the 
employer’s bottom line122—though he calls the employers’ conduct 
in these cases “reasonabl[e]” 123  and “unobjectionable.” 124   Even 
wellness programs, which Professor Henderson touts as 
substantially reducing health costs by regulating employee 
behavior,125 are unlikely to have the sorts of cost-reducing effects he 
presumes they will.126  To the extent that the bottom-line benefits of 
employer regulations of off-work conduct are overblown, social 
equality concerns should be heightened.  And the residual costs of 
avoiding such regulations are appropriately placed on employers 
as the cost of ensuring that their workers can be full members of 
our society.  This is particularly true where, as I have suggested it 
should, the law provides a defense to those categories of employers 
who will face unusually high costs if they cannot regulate their 
employees’ off-work conduct. 
Professor Henderson’s argument also rests on the unproven 
suggestion that regulation of workers’ behavior is inevitable, and 
that where employers cannot engage in that sort of regulation the 
government will. 127   But if off-work activity imposes costs on 
employers, there is no particular reason to believe that the 
government will necessarily step in to regulate that activity if 
employers cannot.  Employers might well pressure the government 
to adopt such regulations, but workers’ groups are likely to oppose 
them—particularly if those groups have succeeded in obtaining 
legislation denying employers the right to regulate that behavior 
                                                 
122  See id. at 1541 (describing how Henry Ford “deployed a team of 150 to 
investigate the lifestyle of each Ford employee,” ensure that they were not 
participating in activities “such as smoking, drinking, gambling, and 
prostitution,” and “ offer employees advice on issues including childcare, money 
management, alcohol abuse, personal hygiene, and house maintenance”); id. at 
1543 n.90 (discussing employers’ recent efforts to incentivize employees to 
“tak[e] classes on managing personal finances, learn[] about art, teach[] their 
children not to watch television or play video games, and so on”); cf. Morriss, 
supra note 4, at 1901 (quoting one of the founders of Ben & Jerry’s as saying: “If I 
can fire someone for making shitty ice cream, then I can fire them for being a 
shitty person.”). 
123 Henderson, supra note 104, at 1540. 
124 Id. at 1543 n.90. 
125 See id. at 1546-1552. 
126 See Al Lewis & Vik Khanna, Is it Time to Re-Examine Workplace Wellness “Get 
Well Quick” Schemes?, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG, Jan. 16, 2013, 
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2013/01/16/is-it-time-to-re-examine-workplace-
wellness-get-well-quick-schemes/.  
127 See Henderson, supra note 104, at 1552. 
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themselves.128  And, as Professor Henderson himself argues, an 
employer’s regulation of an individual’s private life is likely to be 
much more effective than a government’s, because the employer 
does not face the administrative, constitutional, and political 
constraints on individual intrusions that a government does. 129  
Professor Henderson’s argument thus does not fatally undermine 
the case I have made in this section for limiting employers’ power 
to regulate most workers’ off-work conduct. 
  
                                                 
128 Indeed, Professor Henderson recognizes that regulation of worker behavior 
might be an instance of a collective action problem, in which market forces will 
not operate to check employers’ intrusive regulations, even if those regulations 
are inefficient because of the high costs they impose on workers.  See id. at 1584.  
If that is the case, a law denying employers the power to regulate off-work 
conduct will not necessarily be followed by a law giving that power to the 
government. 
129 See id. at 1564, 1576.  
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C. Workers’ Political Speech and Activities 
 1.  The Social Equality Case for Constraining Employers’ 
Regulation of Employees’ Political Speech—Each election cycle, the 
press offers numerous accounts of employers’ efforts to encourage 
their employees to support or oppose particular candidates or 
ballot propositions.  Often, these efforts are backed by implicit or 
even explicit threats to discriminate or retaliate against employees 
who vote or engage in political speech on behalf of the “wrong” 
side.  The 2012 election was no exception.  If anything, as the first 
presidential election after the Supreme Court’s Citizens United 
decision loosened restrictions on corporate political speech,130 the 
2012 election seemed to mark a newly aggressive approach by 
employers.131 
 Some of these employer efforts appeared simply to reflect an 
aggressive effort by management to let employees know which 
candidates’ election would, in their view, best serve the interests of 
the company.  For example, Wynn Resorts issued its employees a 
67-page “Voter Guide” telling them which candidates the company 
supported.132  But even there, some employees detected a coercive 
overtone.  In light of the voter guide and the company CEO’s “fiery 
diatribes against [President] Obama during TV appearances and 
corporate conference calls,” one Wynn employee told a reporter 
that “’[i]f [she] had an Obama bumper sticker, [she’d] be scared for 
[her] job,’” and that she was “worried what might happen to 
employees who are caught backing non-Wynn-sponsored 
candidates outside work, like with ‘a yard sign, a donation or a 
blog [post].’” 133   Another employer, Georgia Pacific, issued a 
similar voter guide, while enforcing a social media policy in a way 
that employees perceived to target their private posting of political 
articles on Facebook.134  And other employers combined appeals to 
                                                 
130 Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
131 See Steven Greenhouse, Here’s a Memo from the Boss: Vote This Way, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 27, 2012 at A1. 
132 Nate C. Hindman & Christina Wilkie, Wynn Employee Voter Guide Pressures 
Workers to Vote Right, HUFFINGTON POST, Oct. 26, 2012. 
133 Id.  In 2004, a company that makes home insulation fired an employee “for 
driving to work with a Kerry-Edwards bumper sticker in the rear windshield of 
her” car.  Timothy Noah, Bumper Sticker Insubordination, SLATE, Sept. 14, 2004. 
134 See Mike Elk, Koch Sends Pro-Romney Mailing to 45,000 Employees While Stifling 
Workplace Political Speech, IN THESE TIMES, Oct. 14, 2012, 
http://inthesetimes.org/article/14017/koch_industries_sends_45000_employees
_pro_romney_mailing (“When McKinney applied for a foreman job at the plant 
in May, he says, his supervisor informed him that a higher-up said he wouldn’t 
34
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their employees to vote for Governor Romney with predictions (or 
perhaps threats) that President Obama’s reelection would lead 
them to lay off workers.135  As Professors Bruce Ackerman and Ian 
Ayres show, this sort of employer conduct is hardly new: “When 
William Jennings Bryan squared off against William McKinley for 
the presidency in 1896, the head of Steinway piano warned his 
workers, ‘Men, vote as you please, but if Bryan is elected 
tomorrow, the whistles will not blow Wednesday morning.’”136 
In other companies, CEOs sent fundraising appeals for 
Governor Romney’s campaign to all of their employees. 137  
According to one press report, one of these companies, Murray 
Energy, “ha[d] for years pressured salaried employees to give to 
the [company’s] political action committee (PAC) and to 
Republican candidates chosen by the company.”138  According to 
that report, internal documents “show that company officials track 
who is and is not giving,”139 and that the company’s CEO, Robert 
Murray, took an intense personal interest in which employees gave 
money.140  The report anonymously quoted two individuals who 
had worked as managers at the company to the following effect: 
“There’s a lot of coercion,” says one of them. “I just wanted 
to work, but you feel this constant pressure that, if you don’t 
contribute, your job’s at stake. You’re compelled to do this 
whether you want to or not.” Says the second: “They will 
                                                                                                                         
get the job because he was ‘too political.’  ‘They said I should be aware of what I 
am posting online,’ says McKinney.”). 
135 See, e.g., Greenhouse, supra note 131 (“’The economy doesn’t currently pose a 
threat to your job.  What does threaten your job, however, is another four years 
of the same presidential administration,’ Mr. Siegel wrote.  ‘If any new taxes are 
levied on me, or my company, as our current president plans, I will have no 
choice but to reduce the size of this company.’”). 
136 Bruce Ackerman & Ian Ayres, Election Bosses: How to Stop Employers from 
Telling Workers Whom to Vote For, SLATE, Nov. 2, 2012. 
137 For examples, see Andy Kroll, CEO of International Corporation Sends Romney 
Fundraising Pitch to His Employees, MOTHER JONES, Oct. 25, 2012, 
http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2012/10/romney-fundraising-email-ceo-
incomm-brooks-smith; Arthur Allen, CEO Of ASG, Sent Email Pressuring Employees 
To Donate To Mitt Romney, HUFFINGTON POST, Oct. 20, 2012, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/20/arthur-allen_n_1992370.html.  
138 Alec MacGillis, Coal Miner’s Donor, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 25, 2012. 
139 Id. 
140 See id.  
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give you a call if you’re not giving. ... It’s expected you 
give Mr. Murray what he asks for.”141 
And when Governor Romney visited a coal mine operated by a 
Murray-owned company for a rally, a company official 
acknowledged that workers were told that attendance at the event 
“would be both mandatory and unpaid.”142 
 Even outside of the realm of electoral politics, employers 
might perceive an interest in regulating the off-the-worksite 
political speech of their employees.  In the well-known Novosel case, 
for example, an insurance company fired a claims manager for 
“refus[ing] to participate in [a company-supported] lobbying 
effort” and privately stating “opposition to the company's political 
stand.” 143   Employers often discipline or fire employees who 
publicly oppose their company’s position on political issues. 144  
And a company might deem it best to fire, or not to hire, an 
employee whose political speech is repugnant to the company’s 
owner or “alienates coworkers, customers, or political figures” who 
regulate the company.145  Such an employee may, but need not, 
express especially extreme political views.146 
                                                 
141 Id.; see also Lisa B. Bingham, Employee Free Speech in the Workplace: Using the 
First Amendment as Public Policy for Wrongful Discharge Actions, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 
341, 342 (1994) (In 1992, a “CEO sent faxes to regional managers strongly 
recommending that they purchase seats at a candidate's fundraiser if they 
intended to have a future with the corporation; one who failed to do so lost his 
job.”); Lewis Maltby, Office Politics: Civic Speech Shouldn’t Get Employees Fired, 
LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 29, 2005 (“William Niess, a Democrat in Wisconsin, refused to 
make a political contribution to the party favored by his boss. As a result, he was 
fired in 1996.”). 
142 Sabrina Eaton, Coal Miners Lost Pay when Mitt Romney Visited their Mine to 
Promote Coal Jobs, PLAIN DEALER, Aug. 28, 2012; see also Bingham, supra note 141, 
at 341 (“During the 1992 presidential campaign, employers required that 
employees sit through a presidential candidate's stump speech as part of a 
company-wide captive audience.”). 
143 Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894, 896 (3d Cir. 1983). 
144 See, e.g., Edmondson v. Shearer Lumber Products, 75 P.3d 733 (Idaho 2003) 
(employee fired for publicly opposing land development project that his 
employer supported). 
145  Eugene Volokh, Private Employees’ Speech and Political Activity: Statutory 
Protection Against Employer Retaliation, 16 TEX. REV. L. & POLITICS 295, 301 (2012). 
146  See Stephen D. Sugarman, “Lifestyle” Discrimination in Employment, 24 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 377, 389 (2003) (“Maybe the employee’s political 
activities and public statements have been considered extremely offensive (such 
as being a grand dragon of the KKK, or speaking out in support of pornography 
or pedophilia), and the employer may say it is responding to pressures from 
other employees and customers.  Other times, the worker’s politics may simply 
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 These practices raise significant concerns from a social 
equality standpoint.  In each case, an employer is using its 
economic power over its employees as leverage to obtain greater 
power in the political sphere.  Workers, fearful of losing their jobs, 
will suppress their own political views or express views with which 
they do not agree. 147   The result will be a skewed political 
discourse, in which employers’ voices are amplified and workers’ 
are squelched.148  Where an employee suppresses political speech 
that relates to the actions of her employer or industry—such as 
speech about health or safety hazards, sharp financial practices, or 
the employer’s compliance with regulations addressing harms like 
those—the political discourse may lose out on a particularly 
distinctive and important perspective. 149   I address 
“whistleblowing” speech of this nature in Part II.D. below.  But 
even where the suppressed speech relates to matters entirely 
separate from the workplace, the employer’s ability to translate its 
economic power into enhanced political power poses a threat to 
social equality.150 
                                                                                                                         
be in conflict with those of a boss who prefers to have like-minded people 
working for the enterprise.”) (footnote omitted).  For a relatively recent example 
of an individual being fired for extreme views that seem to have no bearing on 
the ability to do the job, see Timothy Noah, Can Your Boss Fire You for Your 
Political Beliefs?, SLATE, July 1, 2002 (describing the case of a sewing-machine 
operator who was fired by Goodwill Industries in 2002 for supporting the 
Socialist Workers Party). 
147 See David C. Yamada, Voices from the Cubicle: Protecting and Encouraging Private 
Employee Speech in the Post-Industrial Workplace, 19 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 9-
13 (1998) (discussing the pressures toward worker self-censorship); Maltby, supra 
note 141 (“People need their jobs, and many will sacrifice their rights as citizens 
to continue to provide for themselves and their families.”). 
148 See Clyde W. Summers, The Privatization of Personal Freedoms and Enrichment of 
Democracy: Some Lessons from Labor Law, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 689, 692 (arguing that 
“[i]t makes little difference” whether “a person who speaks out is discharged by 
a public or private employer,” because “[p]olitical discussion is equally 
impoverished, the marketplace of ideas similarly distorted, and respect for the 
person no less denied.”). 
149 See Cynthia L. Estlund, Free Speech and Due Process in the Workplace, 71 IND. L.J. 
101, 111 (1995).  For a general argument that the law should protect “citizen 
employees” who, among other things, bring employer wrongdoing to the 
attention of the public, see Richard R. Carlson, Citizen Employees, 70 LA. L. REV. 
237 (2009). 
150 Cf. S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71 B.U. 
L. REV. 685, 710 (1991) (arguing, from a civic republican perspective, that 
“citizens should be protected from employers’ compulsion or penalization of 
political activity” and that the law should provide “speedy and effective legal 
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 2.  The Doctrinal Response—Employment law should address 
this threat.  And it already does to some extent.  The courts in most 
states recognize a cause of action for wrongful termination against 
public policy.151  But courts have generally not used the public 
policy tort to protect workers’ political speech.  The one notable 
exception is the decision in Novosel, in which the Third Circuit, 
sitting in diversity, predicted that Pennsylvania law would protect 
an employee against discharge for refusing to engage in a lobbying 
campaign sponsored by his employer.152  Subsequent Pennsylvania 
cases discredited that prediction, and courts elsewhere have not 
taken up the Novosel doctrine.153  Many state statutes, however, 
protect workers’ political speech against retaliation by their 
employers.  As Professor Eugene Volokh recently showed, “[a]bout 
half of Americans live in jurisdictions that protect some private 
employee speech or political activity from employer retaliation.”154  
But these statutes have widely disparate coverage.155  Connecticut’s 
statute is the only one broad enough to apply “the same rules to 
private employers as are applied to public employers under the 
First Amendment.”156   
 A social equality perspective suggests that these aspects of 
employment law are moving in the right direction, but they do not 
go far enough.  A focus on social equality suggests the need for a 
general prohibition of adverse employment actions for engaging or 
refusing to engage in off-the-job political speech—including 
political contributions or volunteering.  To be sure, an employer 
has a number of legitimate and wholly business-related interests in 
its employees’ out-of-work speech.  As with worker privacy, the 
law governing worker speech should take account of those interests 
without permitting them simply to trump the interest in social 
equality. 
                                                                                                                         
remedies from discharge, reduction in job benefits, and other employer-
controlled penalties for political activity”). 
151 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 4.01, comment a (Tentative 
Draft No. 2 Revised, 2009). 
152 Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983). 
153 See Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc., 963 F.2d 611, 618-620 (3d Cir. 1992); see 
also Edmondson v. Shearer Lumber Co., 75 P.3d 733, 738-739 (Idaho 2003) (“[T]he 
public policy adopted in Novosel has not been endorsed by any other court, not 
even the Pennsylvania state courts within the federal district of the Circuit that 
issued Novosel.”); Tiernan v. Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc., 506 S.E.2d 
578, 589 (W.Va. 1998) (stating that “Novosel is dubious authority today”). 
154 Volokh, supra note 145, at 297 (emphasis added). 
155 See id. at 309-334. 
156 Id. at 311; see CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-51q. 
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 What are an employer’s financial interests in regulating an 
employee’s political speech outside of the workplace and working 
hours?  I can imagine several.  For one thing, customers may 
attribute that speech to the employer.  If they object to a worker’s 
out-of-work speech, they may punish the employer for retaining 
the employee who engaged in it.157  Coworkers or managers may 
have a difficult time working with an individual who engages in 
out-of-work speech that they find offensive or with which they 
fundamentally disagree.  This may be a particular problem in small 
or closely-held companies.  Finally, an employer may engage in 
political speech of its own solely to enhance its bottom line (which 
seems to be what was going on in Novosel itself).  As Professor Matt 
Bodie explains, “[c]ompanies make political contributions and 
spend on political advertising because it’s good for business—their 
business.”158  An employer’s speech in this regard can be blunted or 
undermined by employees’ out-of-work speech—particularly if the 
employees are hired specifically to express the corporation’s 
political message or are so high-ranking that their speech (even out 
of the office) will likely be attributed by observers to the 
corporation.159   
Of course, an employer may have more ideological and less 
bottom-line-oriented reasons for regulating or compelling its 
workers’ speech on political issues.  A company may be owned by 
staunch opponents or proponents of the war in Afghanistan.  If the 
owners want to exercise their right, protected by the Supreme 
Court in Citizens United and earlier cases, 160  to spend their 
company’s treasury to support their preferred cause, they will have 
                                                 
157 In 1982, for example, the Boston Symphony Orchestra canceled a contract with 
Vanessa Redgrave to narrate a performance of “Oedipus Rex” after subscribers 
and community members protested Ms. Redgrave’s support for the Palestine 
Liberation Organization.  See Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 855 
F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1988) (rejecting Redgrave’s civil rights claim but affirming a 
judgment in her favor for breach of contract). 
158  Matthew T. Bodie, Labor Speech, Corporate Speech, and Political Speech: A 
Reaponse to Professor Sachs, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 206, 206 (2012). 
159 In 1986, for example, the large defense contractor Raytheon fired its chief 
lobbyist after he spoke at a press conference and advocated a reduction in 
defense spending.  See Korb v. Raytheon Corp., 574 N.E.2d 370 (Mass. 1991) 
(rejecting the lobbyist’s wrongful termination claim); see generally Helen Norton, 
Constraining Public Employee Speech: Government’s Control of its Workers’ Speech to 
Protect its Own Expression, 59 DUKE L.J. 1, 41-43 (2009) (describing evidence that 
onlookers often attribute the views of one’s associates to oneself). 
160 See Citizens United v. Federal Election Com’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010); First Nat’l 
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
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to do so by hiring someone to speak on their behalf.  Just as in the 
cases of bottom-line-oriented speech, an employer will have an 
interest in ensuring that those it hires to engage in ideological 
speech do not undermine that message. 
Any protection of private employee speech must take 
account of legitimate employer interests like these.  For example, 
such a protection could exempt particularly small employers or 
perhaps closely-held or nonprofit corporations.  It could exempt the 
highest-ranking executive employees whose speech will be “readily 
identified with the employer.”161  It could also exempt cases in 
which speaking or refusing to speak on a particular topic can be 
regarded as a bona fide occupational qualification.  Such a rule 
would enable an employer to control the out-of-work speech of a 
lobbyist or other individual hired specifically to engage in political 
speech without permitting the employer to control every worker’s 
speech outside of the workplace.  As in the employment 
discrimination context, a BFOQ doctrine would eliminate some of 
the employer’s traditional prerogative to define employees’ jobs.  
To take a recent example, Starbucks might define the job of a 
barista as someone who brews espresso drinks while writing 
messages on cups urging a solution to the fiscal cliff,162 just as 
airlines in the 1970s defined the job of a flight attendant as helping 
customers get from place to place while appealing sexually to male 
business travelers.  A BFOQ rule resists an employer’s casual and 
opportunistic leveraging of its economic power over the speech of 
employees whom it can control simply because of their economic 
dependence on the enterprise.  But it leaves employers free to hire 
individuals specifically for the purpose of speaking on behalf of the 
enterprise and to ensure the effectiveness of their speech. 
3.  Constitutional Questions—There remains the question 
whether a law prohibiting private employers from controlling their 
workers’ political speech—even with the exceptions I have 
suggested—would be consistent with current First Amendment 
doctrine.163  After all, the employer’s interests in this context—in 
                                                 
161 Selmi, supra note 111, at 1054. 
162 See Kevin Drum, Starbucks CEO Should Leave His Baristas Alone, MOTHER JONES, 
Dec. 28, 2012, http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2012/12/starbucks-
ceo-should-leave-his-baristas-alone.  
163 Cf. Julian N. Eule & Jonathan D. Varat, Transporting First Amendment Norms to 
the Private Sector: With Every Wish There Comes a Curse, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1537 
(1998) (arguing that imposing First Amendment norms on private entities may 
actually threaten First Amendment values). 
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avoiding having speech with which it disagrees attributed to it, and 
in engaging in political speech of its own—are interests that the 
Supreme Court has found to be constitutionally based.  These are 
complex issues that deserve an article of their own.  For now, let me 
sketch (far too simplistically) the reasons why I believe a law like 
the one I have defended is consistent with current First 
Amendment doctrine. 
The Supreme Court has held that a state may require a 
“business establishment” to associate itself in some ways with a 
third party’s speech, at least so long as the views of the speaker 
“will not likely be identified with those of the owner”; “no specific 
message is dictated by the State”; and the business “can expressly 
disavow any connection with the message.”164  A law prohibiting 
employers from disciplining workers for off-work speech would 
not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint, as it would apply no 
matter what message the employer or employee wished to express 
or suppress. 165   And when an employee speaks about political 
issues on her own time, her speech is not likely to be understood as 
expressing her employer’s views (at least where she neither was 
hired specifically as a spokesperson or lobbyist nor occupies such a 
senior position in the company as to be understood as speaking for 
it at all times).  Indeed, the very existence of a law protecting the 
off-work political speech of employees should undercut any 
suggestion that that speech could be attributed to the employer.  
The Court has explained that “high school students can appreciate 
the difference between speech a school sponsors and speech the 
school permits because legally required to do so, pursuant to an 
equal access policy.”166  The same point applies here.  In any event, 
                                                 
164 PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87 (1980); see also Rumsfeld 
v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 65 (2006) 
(reaffirming this aspect of PruneYard); Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian 
and Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 576-577, 580 (1995) (reaffirming this aspect of 
PruneYard, but holding that the First Amendment prohibited the state from 
requiring operators of “an expressive parade” to include participants expressing 
a message with which they disagreed, where inclusion of those participants 
would dilute “the parade’s overall message” and disavowal by the parade 
operators would be impractical). 
165 Cf. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utilities Com’n, 475 U.S. 1, 12-15 (1986) 
(plurality opinion) (requiring utility company to include in its billing mailer 
statements from third parties chosen specifically because they disagree with the 
company’s views is viewpoint-discriminatory and impermissibly burdens the 
company’s right to express its views). 
166 Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 65.  One cannot, of course, press this point too far without 
eliminating any constitutional protection against forced association with 
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the employer can always disavow an employee’s off-work 
speech—whether through a general disclaimer of responsibility for 
anything an employee says outside of the workplace or in response 
to a specific act of speech that the employer, customers, or 
coworkers find particularly offensive. 
In Boy Scouts v. Dale, the Court held that requiring an 
“expressive association” to admit to membership an individual 
who (in his outside life) vocally disagreed with the association’s 
message violated the First Amendment.167  The Court concluded 
that such forced membership significantly burdened the 
association’s message without serving a sufficiently strong 
interest.168  But a commercial enterprise’s hiring and retention of an 
employee—at least where the employee is not hired specifically to 
express a message—seems a far cry from an expressive 
association’s decision to admit an individual to membership.169 
To be sure, the Court held in Citizens United v. FEC that the 
government may not prohibit a corporation from engaging in 
political speech. 170   A corporation can act only through its 
employees.  To engage in its constitutionally protected political 
                                                                                                                         
another’s speech.  But in the context of out-of-work speech by ordinary 
employees, one need not push the point to the logical limit.  Unless such an 
individual expressly refers to her status as an employee of a particular employer, 
it is fair to insist that the employer not act on the premise that the individual’s 
speech will be attributed to it.  Cf. Selmi, supra note 111, at 1054 (arguing that, 
when the worker does expressly refer to her status as its employee, an employer 
may require her to make clear that she speaks only for herself). 
167 Boy Scouts v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 653-654 (2000). 
168 See Dale, 530 U.S. at 659; see also Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church 
and School v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 712 (2012) (citing Dale to support its holding 
that the First Amendment protects a church’s choice of whom to admit to the 
ministry). 
169 Cf. Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 69 (concluding that permitting military personnel to 
recruit at law schools did not violate Dale, because recruiters are “outsiders who 
come onto campus for the limited purpose of trying to hire students—not to 
become members of the school’s expressive association”).  The analysis in text 
tracks, at a reasonably high level of abstraction, one of the leading defenses of 
Dale.  Professor Dale Carpenter argues that Dale protects the right against 
compelled association in expressive, but not in commercial, activity.  See Dale 
Carpenter, Expressive Association and Anti-Discrimination Law After Dale: A 
Tripartite Approach, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1515 (2001).  There is a substantial argument 
that Professor Carpenter’s reading of Dale is too broad and unduly limits state 
power over even noncommercial associations.  See Andrew Koppelman, Should 
Noncommercial Associations Have an Absolute Right to Discriminate?, 67 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 27 (2004).  If that is so, my proposal should stand on even 
firmer constitutional ground. 
170 Citizens United v. Federal Election Com’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
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speech, then, a corporation must be free to hire individuals to speak 
on its behalf.  And it must be free to require those individuals not 
to undercut the message it has hired them to express.  But that does 
not mean that employers have a constitutional right to transform 
the speech of all of their employees—even those who are hired to 
engage in productive activity quite distinct from expressing a 
message—into the speech of the corporation.  In the context of 
government speech, the Court has held that the government may 
hire contractors to express a message and may take measures to 
ensure that those contractors do not undercut that message.171  But 
it has suggested that the government may not regulate those 
contractors—nor, notably, their employees—in their speech outside 
of the contract. 172   Similarly, the Court has said that public 
employers can regulate out-of-work speech when employees 
deliberately seek to link that speech to their employers.173  But it 
has not held that public employers can regulate their employees’ 
off-duty speech when the worker does not seek to draw such a 
link.174  Consistent with current First Amendment doctrine, courts 
could draw a similar distinction here: between a corporation’s own 
political speech, which the government generally may not prohibit, 
and the political speech of its employees on their own time, which 
the government may regulate the corporation to protect.175 
This discussion no doubt glosses over some important 
points.  But I hope I have shown that a focus on social equality 
supports a call for greater protection of private employees’ out-of-
                                                 
171 See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 196 (1991). 
172 See id. at 197-199. 
173 See City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 84 (2004). 
174 But cf. Norton, supra note 159, at 18-19 (discussing lower-court cases allowing 
cities to sanction police officers for their off-duty speech, though those cases 
might be explained as applications of the principle that police officers are the sort 
of employees whose speech will always be reasonably attributed by observers to 
their government employers). 
175 It is true that the speech of many employees will be facilitated by the wages or 
salaries they earn, but that does not make their speech constitutionally 
attributable to their employers.  “All speakers, including individuals and the 
media, use money amassed from the economic marketplace to fund their speech.  
The First Amendment protects the resulting speech, even if it was enabled by 
economic transactions with persons or entities who disagree with the speaker’s 
ideas.”  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 905.  There is an interesting parallel here with 
the current debate over whether employers can be required to offer their workers 
insurance policies that cover contraception, though the religious liberty issues in 
that debate are sufficiently distinct from the matters I discuss in this article that I 
leave them for another day.  See generally Caroline Mala Corbin, The Contraception 
Mandate, 107 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 151 (2012) (addressing those issues). 
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work political speech, and that such protection is at least plausibly 
consistent with current First Amendment doctrine. 
D.  Prohibitions on Retaliation 
 Employment law contains important, but incomplete, 
protections for workers who speak out on their employers’ 
violations of law.  These laws advance social equality in two 
respects.  First, as I suggested above, they protect the ability of 
workers to participate in public discourse in those areas in which 
they have the most distinctive contributions to make as employees.  
Many courts have therefore applied the public policy tort to 
prohibit terminating an employee because she truthfully testified or 
participated in an investigation regarding her employer’s 
compliance with the law. 176   Any number of federal and state 
whistleblowing statutes—most notably the whistleblowing 
provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act177—also protect employees 
against adverse treatment taken because they reported their 
employers for statutory or regulatory violations or financial 
improprieties. 178   The antiretaliation provisions of various 
workplace statutes also protect employees who oppose or file 
complaints against employers’ violations of those statutes.179   
                                                 
176  See, e.g., Orly Lobel, Citizenship, Organizational Citizenship, and the Laws of 
Overlapping Obligations, 97 CAL. L. REV. 433, 445-446 (2009) (“All jurisdictions that 
recognize the public policy exception apply it where the employee informs a 
government agency about her suspicions.”); Stewart J. Schwab, Wrongful 
Discharge Law and the Search for Third Party Effects, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1943, 1966-1967 
(1996) (collecting cases). 
177 18 U.S.C. § 1514A; see Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an 
Era of Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 376 (2005) (describing Sarbanes-
Oxley as the “gold standard in protection of employee whistleblowers”).  The 
Dodd-Frank Act expanded on Sarbanes-Oxley’s whistleblower protections.  See 
Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Mutiny by the Bounties? The Attempt to Reform Wall 
Street by the New Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, 2012 B.Y.U. L. REV. 
73, 85-95. 
178  For a comprehensive survey of state statutory and common-law 
whistleblower protections, and of federal whistleblower statutes enacted as of 
2004, see Miriam A. Cherry, Whistling in the Dark? Corporate Fraud, Whistleblowers, 
and the Implications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for Employment Law, 79 WASH. L. REV. 
1029, 1087-1123 (2004). 
179 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (prohibiting employers from discriminating 
against an employee “because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful 
employment practice by” Title VII); 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (prohibiting employers 
from “discharg[ing] or in any manner discriminat[ing] against any employee 
because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be 
instituted any proceeding under or related to this chapter or has testified or is 
about to testify in any such proceeding or because of the exercise by such 
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But these laws have significant limitations.  Both the public 
policy tort and whistleblower statutes are inconsistent in their 
coverage.180  Moreover, they typically do not protect employees’ 
speech to the general public.181  Rather, they are generally limited 
to protecting whistleblowing speech made in one of two 
circumstances:  (1) in conjunction with an investigation or judicial, 
administrative, or legislative proceeding182; or in some cases, (2) in 
an employee’s communications with her supervisor 183 —though 
many do not even reach the latter circumstance. 184   The 
antiretaliation provisions of the federal employment discrimination 
laws, at least, are broader in their protection of employee speech 
that opposes violations of those laws.185   
The public policy tort and the whistleblower and anti-
retaliation laws also serve social equality in a second respect: they 
protect workers’ access to the processes for petitioning the state for 
redress of grievances and for obtaining the protection of the laws.  
Thus, courts in a number of states have held that an employer 
engages in wrongful discharge by firing an employee for claiming 
worker’s compensation or (during layoff periods) unemployment 
benefits.186  The proposed Restatement of Employment Law would 
generalize this principle and provide a tort cause of action for 
employees who are disciplined for “fil[ing] a charge or claim[ing] a 
benefit in good faith under an employment statute or law 
(irrespective of whether the charge or claim is meritorious).”187  
And numerous state and federal laws that extend rights to 
                                                                                                                         
employee on behalf of himself or others of any right afforded by” the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act). 
180 See, e.g., Cherry, supra note 178, at 1049 (concluding that “state whistleblower 
law is murky, piecemeal, disorganized, and varies from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction” and that “the federal statutory scheme results in a haphazard 
enforcement structure”). 
181  Connecticut is the only state that gives employees general free-speech 
protection against private employers.  See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-51q.   
182 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1)(A) & (B), (a)(2) (antiretaliation provision of 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act). 
183 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(3) (antiretaliation provision of Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act). 
184 See Lobel, supra note 176, at 445-447. 
185  See Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson 
County, 555 U.S. 271 (2009) (reading Title VII’s opposition clause broadly in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning of the word “oppose”).   
186  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 4.02 Reporters Notes 
comment d (Tentative Draft Revised, 2009) (collecting cases). 
187 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 4.02(c) (Tentative Draft Revised, 
2009). 
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employees contain their own antiretaliation provisions protecting 
workers who pursue charges or claims under them.188 
An employer that uses its economic power to prevent a 
worker from reporting its violations of law threatens social equality 
in at least two dimensions: one that relates to dynamics outside of 
the workplace, and the other that relates to dynamics within the 
workplace.  The ability to petition the government for redress of 
grievances, seek the protection of the laws, and call another person 
to account for violating one’s rights is a core aspect of citizenship in 
our democratic polity.189  When employer retaliation forecloses that 
ability for a worker, it denies the worker full membership in the 
broader community.  But even those dynamics that are purely 
internal to the workplace matter for social equality.  As Professor 
Cynthia Estlund has shown, the workplace is a central location in 
our society for the development and exercise of citizenship. 190  
When an employer can effectively foreclose a worker from seeking 
redress for a violation of the worker’s own rights guaranteed by 
law, the employer communicates the worker’s subordinate status 
clearly and effectively.  Retaliation exacerbates and entrenches 
hierarchies of status within workplaces, by “prey[ing] on the most 
vulnerable” employees, while “simultaneously magnif[ying] the 
power of high-status persons” such as owners and supervisors.191 
By helping to ensure that workers can report employers’ 
violations of their legal rights, the legal suite of antiretaliation 
protections advances and protects social equality.  As the Supreme 
Court explained when it interpreted Title IX of the Education 
Amendments as including a prohibition against retaliation, the 
objective of ensuring individuals effective protection against 
discrimination “would be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve if 
persons who complain about sex discrimination did not have 
effective protection against retaliation.” 192   That is because 
antidiscrimination laws, like other workplace laws, cannot be 
effectively enforced without individual employees’ reports of 
                                                 
188  See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (Fair Labor Standard Act); id. § 660(c)(1) 
(Occupational Safety and Health Act); id. § 2615(b)(1) (Family and Medical Leave 
Act); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (Title VII of Civil Rights Act); id. § 12203(a) 
(Americans with Disabilities Act). 
189 See supra text accompanying notes 53-54. (explaining why access to such legal 
and governmental processes is essential to social equality). 
190  See CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER: HOW WORKPLACE BONDS 
STRENGTHEN A DIVERSE DEMOCRACY (2003). 
191 Deborah Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18, 40 (2005). 
192 Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 180 (2005). 
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violations.  As Professor Estlund persuasively shows, enforcement 
of workplace rights depends on “vigorous encouragement and 
protection of individual employees who speak up about rights and 
regulatory infractions.”193 
But the suite of antiretaliation protections does not yet 
provide protection for all employees who claim violations of their 
workplace rights.  In particular, workers who assert rights under 
state law will be denied protection if they live in one of the many 
states that does not provide a wrongful discharge cause of action 
for retaliation for the exercise of employment rights.  A social 
equality perspective suggests that the suite of antiretaliation 
protections should be expanded to fill that gap.  In particular, the 
wrongful discharge tort should generally protect employees’ 
complaints about violations of their legal rights. 
As with the other doctrinal areas I have discussed, 
employers have legitimate interests here, and the law should take 
account of them.  For one thing, whistleblowers’ complaints can be 
frivolous, asserted in bad faith, or raised in a needlessly adversarial 
or disruptive manner.194  Social equality requires that employees be 
able to speak out about violations of their workplace rights or their 
employers’ other violations of law; it does not require that they be 
permitted to use whistleblower laws to harass their employers.  
Accordingly, it would be fully consistent with a social equality 
approach to accommodate the employer interests here.  The law 
might do this by explicitly adopting a balancing test.  The 
Connecticut statute, for example, does not protect conduct that 
“substantially or materially interfere[s] with the employee’s bona 
fide job performance or the working relationship between the 
employee and the employer.” 195   The Connecticut courts have 
interpreted that language as incorporating the Connick/Pickering 
doctrine from the Supreme Court’s First Amendment case law, 
which balances the public interest in the speech against the 
employer’s interest in efficient management of the workplace.196 
But, as Professor George Rutherglen has persuasively 
argued, such a balancing test has serious flaws.  “The hard cases 
typically reduce to a direct conflict between incommensurable 
                                                 
193 Estlund, supra note 177, at 376. 
194 See Lobel, supra note 176, at 464-465 (describing how courts have denied 
protection to bad faith, frivolous, or needlessly disruptive whistleblowing 
speech). 
195 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-51q. 
196 See Schumann v. Dianon Systems, Inc., 43 A.3d 111, 121-123 (Conn. 2012). 
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rights: on the part of the employee to talk about what goes on at 
work and on the part of the employer to control it.” 197   The 
balancing test in employee speech cases thus “turns out, upon 
examination, to be an illusory balance between poorly defined 
interests.” 198   Professor Rutherglen shows that the result is 
systematically to underprotect the employee’s speech interest—the 
interest, in my terms, in social equality—while denying certainty 
and predictability to both employees and employers.199 
A more promising approach would adopt specific subrules 
to identify those categories of whistleblowing speech that threaten 
legitimate employer interest and can be exempted from protection 
without significant harm to social equality.  The proposed 
Restatement, for example, would protect whistleblowing 
employees only when they have a good-faith belief that the 
employer has violated the law. 200   Further limiting employees’ 
whistleblowing rights, the lower federal courts have accorded 
protection under antiretaliation statutes only to those workers who 
act on the basis of a reasonable belief that the employer violated the 
law.201  These rules recognize that, given the uncertainties of an 
employer’s underlying legal obligations, workers need breathing 
space to complain without fear that a court will later conclude that 
their employers did not violate those obligations.  But they also 
prevent frivolous and harassing complaints that the law need not 
protect to serve social equality. 
Professor Orly Lobel contends that antiretaliation law 
should take account of employers’ interests in a distinct respect.  
She argues that the law should incentivize workers to present 
whistleblower complaints to their employers first, and should 
privilege them to complain outside of the company only if the 
employer fails to provide satisfaction (or to create a process that 
can be expected to be responsive to meritorious claims).202  One 
model for her approach is the Supreme Court’s harassment 
                                                 
197 George Rutherglen, Public Employee Speech in Remedial Perspective, 24 J. L. & 
POL. 129, 144 (2008). 
198 Id. at 143. 
199 See id. at 143-144. 
200  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 4.02(c) (Tentative Draft 
Revised, 2009).  
201 See Richard Moberly, The Supreme Court’s Antiretaliation Principle, 61 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 375, 446-451 (2010). 
202 See Lobel, supra note 176, at 461-467. 
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jurisprudence.203  That body of law was designed to incentivize 
employers to create internal processes that effectively prevent and 
respond to harassment and, at the same time, to incentivize 
employees to take advantage of those processes. 204   But that 
jurisprudence has not lived up to its promise to protect 
employees. 205   More generally, Professor Lobel’s argument is 
driven by a belief in “new governance” approaches that place a 
heavy premium on employer self-regulation.206  But I am skeptical 
that such self-regulation can adequately preserve employees’ 
ability to speak out about violations of law in the workplace.207  To 
the extent that Professor Lobel argues that workers should be 
protected against employer retaliation when they make internal 
whistleblowing complaints, I agree; such retaliation is a major 
threat to social equality.  But to the extent that she argues that 
employers should be empowered to discipline or fire workers who 
make reasonable, good-faith complaints to external authorities 
about violations of law at the workplace, her proposal would 
undermine social equality and should be rejected. 
E.  Arbitration 
 The growth of employment arbitration, aided and abetted by 
a number of Supreme Court decisions, 208  also raises significant 
concerns from a social equality perspective. 209   The doctrinal 
implications of those concerns are less clear, however.  Critics of 
arbitration argue that it operates in a manner that undermines the 
rights granted by employment statutes and the common law.210  
                                                 
203 See id. at 473-475 (citing, inter alia, Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 
805-808 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998)). 
204 See Michael C. Harper, Employer Liability for Harassment under Title VII: A 
Functional Rationale for Faragher and Ellerth, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 41 (1999). 
205 See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination 
Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1, 24-25 (2006). 
206 See Lobel, supra note 176, at 470-473. 
207 I discuss the reasons for my skepticism in Bagenstos, supra note 205, at 20-40. 
208 The most notable of these have been Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 
500 U.S. 20 (1991) (holding that a claim under the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act could be subject to contractually binding arbitration); Circuit 
City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (holding that the Federal 
Arbitration Act applies to employment contracts); and 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. 
Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009) (holding that a collective bargaining agreement could 
require arbitration of individual employees’ claims under the federal 
employment discrimination laws). 
209 See Bagchi, supra note 16, at 612-614. 
210 See Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool? Debunking the Supreme Court’s 
Preference for Private Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 695 (1996). 
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They contend that arbitration favors employers—who, as repeat 
players, have an outsized influence on the selection of arbitrators.211  
They contend that virtually all of the process that arbitration 
removes is process that benefits workers.212  And they note that a 
large number of arbitration decisions remain confidential or are 
released in only a redacted form, which undermines the public-
education benefits of litigation.213  Taken together, one critic has 
charged, employment arbitration provisions facilitate “a new 
feudal order,” in which contract is “used to create status, or at least 
reinforce the lack thereof.”214 
These arguments do suggest that arbitration of employment 
claims undermines workers’ ability to petition their government for 
redress of grievances, obtain the protection of the laws, and call 
employers to account.  They thus provide reasons to be skeptical, 
from a social equality perspective, of the spread of mandatory 
employment arbitration.  But there is another side to the story.  
Many defenders of the practice contend, with some support, that 
arbitration is more accessible than are judicial proceedings, so that 
in many cases arbitration will provide a more effective means for 
individual workers to obtain the protection of the laws than will 
the filing of a lawsuit.215  In part for this reason, advocates of just-
                                                 
211  See Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat-Player Effect, 1 
EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 189 (1997); cf. Cynthia L. Estlund, Between Rights 
and Contract: Arbitration Agreements and Non-Compete Covenants as a Hybrid Form of 
Employment Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 430 (2006) (noting various reasons to 
think employers have a repeat-player advantage but finding the empirical 
evidence “equivocal at best”); but see Michael Z. Green, Debunking the Myth of 
Employer Advantage from Using Mandatory Arbitration for Discrimination Claims, 31 
RUTGERS L.J. 399, 400-401 (1999) (“As a matter of general practice, the use of 
mandatory arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism for employment 
discrimination claims has failed to give employers an overall advantage.”) 
(footnotes omitted). 
212 See Kathryn A. Sabbeth & David C. Vladeck, Contracting (Out) Rights, 36 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 803, 829-833 (2009). 
213 See Estlund, supra note 211, at 433; Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory 
Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1672 (2005). 
214 Paul H. Haagen, New Wineskins for New Wine: The Need to Encourage Fairness in 
Mandatory Arbitration, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1039, 1063 (1998); see also Bagchi, supra 
note 16, at 614 (“If employers are permitted to use biased arbitration procedures 
to evade even those basic background checks on employer power imposed by 
law, the resulting situation of unchecked authority magnifies the 
disempowerment associated with low status.”). 
215  See Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate Over 
Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 559; 
Theodore J. St. Antoine, Mandatory Arbitration: Why It’s Better Than It Looks, 41 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 783 (2008); David Sherwyn, J. Bruce Tracey, & Zev J. Eigen, In 
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cause termination regimes typically argue that those regimes 
should be enforced through a system of arbitration.216  But the 
argument that arbitration is a more effective forum for workers to 
vindicate their employment rights remains highly controversial.217 
For present purposes, there is no need to assess these 
competing claims, which rest largely on empirical disagreements.  
Rather, two points are crucial.  First, from a social equality 
perspective, employment arbitration should be encouraged only if 
and to the extent that it advances the ability of workers to obtain 
redress for their employers’ violations of their legal rights.  That 
arbitration may be cheaper or more efficient than a lawsuit cannot 
save mandatory arbitration under a social equality analysis unless 
the cost savings and efficiencies reduce the barriers to workers’ 
access to the process.218 
Second, given the quite significant threat that arbitration 
poses to social equality, courts should be vigilant in ensuring that 
arbitration occurs in a procedural context that mitigates that threat.  
In particular, courts should not hesitate to invalidate arbitration 
provisions that have the effect of keeping meritorious claims from 
being decided.  The social equality analysis thus provides a basis 
for challenging application of the Supreme Court’s recent decision 
in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion219 to employment arbitration.  
In holding that a state-law prohibition on class-action bans was 
preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act,220 the Court there gave 
short shrift to the concern that class adjudication (whether in court 
or in arbitration) is essential to ensuring that some meritorious 
                                                                                                                         
Defense of Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Disputes: Saving the Baby, Tossing 
Out the Bath Water, and Constructing a New Sink in the Process, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & 
EMP. L. 73 (1999); see also Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Forum 
Accessibility: Empirical Evidence, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 813 (2008) (finding the 
empirical evidence inconclusive overall, but finding reason to think that 
arbitration is more accessible than litigation for many low-wage employees, 
though less accessible than litigation for other employees); cf. Estlund, supra note 
211, at 436-437 (arguing that a fair arbitration agreement should benefit many 
employees). 
216 See supra text accompanying note 94. 
217  For a particularly powerful rebuttal, see David S. Schwartz, Mandatory 
Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1247 (2009). 
218 This seems to be largely Professor Estlund’s argument.  See Estlund, supra note 
211, at 426-438. 
219 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
220 See id. at 1753. 
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claims will be brought at all.221  Whatever one may think about that 
concern in the consumer-contract setting of Concepcion itself,222 an 
extension of the Court’s analysis to the employment setting would 
raise serious social equality concerns.223 
Consistent with my analysis, the National Labor Relations 
Board’s recent D.R. Horton decision held that employment 
arbitration agreements that include class action waivers are 
invalid.224  The Board concluded that such agreements interfere 
with employees’ rights under the National Labor Relations Act to 
engage in concerted action (including concerted legal action) for 
their mutual aid and protection.225  The Fifth Circuit has stayed the 
Board’s decision, however, and lower federal courts have so far 
refused to endorse it.226  Nonetheless, a social equality perspective 
suggests that the Board was right to hesitate before extending 
Concepcion’s holding to the employment context.   
F.  Child Labor and Maximum-Hours Laws 
 A number of employment law doctrines can be profitably 
understood as advancing a distinct aspect of social equality.  These 
doctrines ensure that individuals have the time, space, and ability 
to participate in democratic citizenship.  The significant restriction 
of child labor is a prime example.227  Although opponents of child 
labor have often made arguments that rest on a notion of 
compulsion—that children cannot, as a practical matter, make a 
                                                 
221  See Myriam Gilles, Procedure in Eclipse: Group-Based Adjudication in a Post-
Concepcion Era, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1203, 1225 (2012); Myriam Gilles & Gary 
Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v. 
Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623 (2012). 
222 See Samuel Issacharoff & Erin F. Delaney, Credit Card Accountability, 73 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 157, 175-182 (2006) (arguing, before Concepcion, that mandatory 
arbitration clauses with class-action bans make certain consumer claims 
impossible to vindicate); but cf. Omri Ben-Shahar, Arbitration and Access to Justice: 
Economic Analysis, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2197013 (Jan. 2013) 
(expressing skepticism about this conclusion). 
223 See Estlund, supra note 211, at 427-429 (arguing, before Concepcion, that “[b]oth 
the effect of negating some nonwaivable employee rights and the apparent 
purpose of foreclosing some meritorious claims altogether condemn class action 
waiver clauses” in the employment setting). 
224 D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 NLRB No. 184 (Jan. 3, 2012),  
225 See id. at 5. 
226 See Andrus v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 2012 WL 5989646 at *4 n.1 (D. Nev., Nov. 12, 
2012) (noting that the Fifth Circuit had stayed the Board’s decision). 
227 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(l), 212 (child labor provisions of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act). 
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free choice whether to work228—another significant strand of the 
case against child labor rests on a notion of democratic citizenship.  
To the extent that children who work too young or for too many 
hours lose out on time for education, 229  child labor deprives 
individuals of the opportunity to develop the skills and capacity 
necessary for full citizenship.230 
Our legal and constitutional tradition has long endorsed the 
role of education in developing the means to exercise equal 
citizenship.  James Madison’s famous letter to W.T. Barry, 
“applaud[ing]” what Madison called Kentucky’s “liberal 
appropriations” to support “a general system of Education,” 
provides an early example: 
A popular Government, without popular information, or the 
means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a 
Tragedy; or, perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern 
ignorance: And a people who mean to be their own 
Governors, must arm themselves with the power which 
knowledge gives.231 
In recent decades, the Supreme Court has similarly endorsed the 
importance of education to full social and democratic citizenship.232  
                                                 
228 John Stuart Mill described this notion pithily: “Freedom of contract, in the case 
of children, is but another word for freedom of coercion.”  V JOHN STUART MILL, 
PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, Ch. XI § 30 (1848).  For authors collecting 
examples of these sorts of arguments, see Kaushik Basu, Child Labor: Cause, 
Consequence, and Cure, with Remarks on International Labor Standards, 37 J. ECON. 
LIT. 1083, 1093-1095 (1999); and Mark Blaug, The Classical Economists and the 
Factory Acts—A Re-Examination, 72 Q. J. ECON. 211 (1958). 
229 The degree to which child labor displaces education will no doubt depend on 
the age of the child, the number of hours worked, the educational opportunities 
that would otherwise be available, and other local social and economic factors.  
See, e.g., Basu, supra note 228, at 1093 (discussing studies showing a variety of 
effects of child labor on education). 
230 Mill again puts the point well.  He argues that “[t]here are certain primary 
elements and means of knowledge, which it is in the highest degree desirable 
that all human beings born into the community should acquire during 
childhood,” and that the failure to provide education in those elements breaches 
a duty “towards the members of the community generally, who are all liable to 
suffer seriously from the consequences of ignorance and want of education in 
their fellow-citizens.”  V MILL, supra note , Ch. XI § 24. 
231  Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry, Aug. 4, 1822, http://press-
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch18s35.html.  
232 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) (accepting “that some 
degree of education is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively and 
intelligently in our open political system if we are to preserve freedom and 
independence” and that “education prepares individuals to be self-reliant and 
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When children are forced, by their families’ economic 
circumstances, to work at a young age and forgo basic educational 
opportunities, they are likely to become locked into an 
“underclass” defined by a self-perpetuating cycle of poverty and 
inequality.233  Laws restricting child labor are best understood as 
preserving the opportunities for all children to become full and 
equal citizens.  
 Child labor may seem a bit remote from the problems of 
American employment law today.234  But the scope and application 
of maximum-hours laws235 to the general workforce remains a vital 
topic in the field.  And those laws, too, can be profitably 
understood as preserving the space for workers to develop 
capacities for participating in social citizenship.  Indeed, notions of 
social citizenship played a significant part in workers’ agitation for 
maximum-hours laws in the decades surrounding the turn of the 
Twentieth Century.  As one study of workers’ advocacy during the 
period shows, “a persistent theme among nineteenth and early 
twentieth century shorter hours advocates was that shorter hours 
yield enhanced leisure time with which working people could 
improve their minds and become better citizens.”236  When workers 
repeated the slogan “Eight hours for work, eight hours for rest, and 
                                                                                                                         
self-sufficient participants in society”); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 
483, 493 (1954) (describing education as “the very foundation of good 
citizenship”). 
233 It was precisely this concern about creating a self-perpetuating underclass that 
led the Court to strike down a law barring free public education of the children 
of undocumented immigrants.  See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221-223 (1982); see 
also id. at 234 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“Children denied an education are 
placed at a permanent and insurmountable competitive disadvantage, for an 
uneducated child is denied even the opportunity to achieve.  And when those 
children are members of an identifiable group, that group—through the State's 
action—will have been converted into a discrete underclass.”); id. at 239 (Powell, 
J., concurring) (describing the law at issue as “threaten[ing] the creation of an 
underclass of future citizens and residents”). 
234 But see Marjorie Elizabeth Wood, Pitting Child Safety Against the Family Farm, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2012 (noting controversy over Obama Administration’s 
quickly-abandoned efforts to impose new child labor restrictions on hazardous 
agricultural employment). 
235  See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 207 (maximum-hours provision of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act). 
236  Matthew S. Bewig, Lochner v. The Journeyman Bakers of New York: The 
Journeyman Bakers, Their Hours of Labor, and the Constitution, 38 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 
413, 443 (1994). 
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eight hours for what we will”237—the “what we will” often referred 
to educational and civic activities.238 
And the point remains a vital one today. 239   A large 
proportion of workers are spending increasing amounts of time at 
work, which crowds out their ability to engage in personal 
development or participate in the civic life of their community.240  
As Professor Todd Rakoff points out, “[t]ime spent not-working” 
includes “time spent going to religious services and participating in 
civic groups,” as well as “time spent forming political opinions and 
working as a citizen.”241  In light of the increasing time spent at 
work, Professor Estlund argues that we should treat the workplace 
as a central arena for civic and democratic participation.242  But one 
can endorse Professor Estlund’s argument as one proposal for 
responding to work’s crowding out of civic engagement without 
endorsing the underlying trend.  Maximum-hours laws provide a 
lever to fight that underlying trend. 
The problem of overwork appears to be concentrated among 
“white collar” workers 243 —many of whom are not especially 
wealthy or powerful within or outside of their workplaces.244  A 
social equality perspective might therefore make one receptive to 
proposals to narrow the FLSA’s white-collar exemptions. 245  
                                                 
237 E.g., Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Changing the People, Legal Regulation and American 
Democracy, 86 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 42 (2011). 
238 See Bewig, supra note 236, at 443-447. 
239 See TODD. D. RAKOFF, A TIME FOR EVERY PURPOSE: LAW AND THE BALANCE OF 
LIFE 68 (2002) (“In the present day, the fundamental reason to set a legal limit to 
work time is to make time available for other important social activities.”). 
240 See, e.g., RAKOFF, supra note 239, at 169. 
241 RAKOFF, supra note 239, at 68. 
242  See ESTLUND, supra note 190.  Along similar lines, Professor Laura 
Rosenburyargues that we should treat the workplace as an important locus of 
friendships and intimate ties.  See Laura A. Rosenbury, Working Relationships, 35 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 117 (2011). 
243 See RAKOFF, supra note 239, at 77-80. 
244 See Adam T. Klein, Mark R. Humowiecki, Tarik F. Ajami & Cara E. Greene, 
The DOL’s New FLSA White Collar Exemption Regulations and Working with the DOL 
on FLSA Actions, 10 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 459 (2006) (noting that under 
the new Department of Labor regulations the white-collar exemptions can apply 
to an employee with a salary as low as $23,660 per year).  For a good discussion 
of the application of these exemptions to retail store managers—many of whom 
make little more than minimum wage—see Drew Frederick, Comment, Exempt 
Executives? Dollar General Store Managers’ Embattled Quest for Overtime Pay Under 
the Fair Labor Standards Act, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 277 (2011). 
245 To be sure, the problem of crowding out civic life exists for workers who are 
covered by the FLSA as well.  See Shirley Lung, Overwork and Overtime, 39 IND. L. 
55
Bagenstos:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2013
 55
Commentators have suggested a number of possibilities in this 
regard.  Union lawyer Scott Miller proposes replacing the white-
collar exemptions with one, modeled on the “key employee” 
exemption under the Family and Medical Leave Act, that would 
exclude the top 10 percent of an employer’s workforce (defined by 
salary) from maximum-hours coverage.246  Sociologist Juliet Schor 
similarly proposes allowing employers to “exempt the top 20% of 
their workforce from the 40-hour week standard, but that they be 
required to designate an alternate standard of weekly and annual 
hours for this 20%.”247  Professor Rakoff proposes eliminating the 
white-collar exemptions for those currently exempt workers who 
“either have regular hours or already keep track of their hours for 
business purposes.”248  He would continue to exempt only those 
“high-level employees who work disparate and irregular hours 
without any ordinary reason to keep track of them.”249 
These various proposals have their strengths and 
weaknesses from a policy perspective.  But the problem is even 
more complex than that.  As Professor Deborah Malamud’s 
research has shown, the boundaries of the white-collar exemptions 
have both material and symbolic effects, and these may point in 
different directions.250  Although limiting the application of the 
white-collar exemptions will tend to advance social equality by 
freeing up more time for newly-covered workers to spend “as they 
will,” it may at the same time undermine that effect by sending the 
message that those workers should be treated as having a lower 
status more generally.  A social equality perspective cannot answer 
the question of how these considerations ultimately balance against 
each other.251  But I hope I have shown that it helpfully highlights a 
key factor that policymakers must take into account in elaborating, 
applying, and considering reforms to the Fair Labor Standards Act. 
                                                                                                                         
REV. 51 (2005) (responding to the problem by arguing for a statutory right to 
refuse overtime). 
246 See Scott D. Miller, Work/Life Balance and the White-Collar Employee Under the 
FLSA, 7 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 5 (2003). 
247  Juliet B. Schor, Worktime in Contemporary Context: Amending the Fair Labor 
Standards Act, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 157 (1994). 
248 RAKOFF, supra note 239, at 81. 
249 RAKOFF, supra note 239, at 82. 
250 See Deborah C. Malamud, Engineering the Middle Classes: Class Line-Drawing in 
New Deal Hours Legislation, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2212 (1998). 
251  It does suggest, however, that Professor Malamud is probably correct in 
urging that it is “time to genuinely rethink the FLSA and its upper-level 
exemptions, not merely to ‘simplify’ them or remake them to maximize employer 
‘flexibility.’”  Id. at 2319-2320. 
56
Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 62 [2013]
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/62
 56
CONCLUSION 
 In this paper, I have offered an egalitarian theory of 
individual employment law.  I have argued that employment law 
can be profitably understood as serving the interest in promoting 
social equality—and that its rules can be analyzed, defended, and 
critiqued based on the degree to which they advance that interest.  
Like the rules of employment discrimination law, which also 
promote social equality, I have argued that rules of individual 
employment law are justified even if they impose costs on 
employers.  Each employer, I have argued, has an obligation to 
spend reasonable sums to avoid contributing to social inequality.  
And I have argued that employment law can draw on the 
techniques employment discrimination law uses to ensure that 
particular employers are not called upon to bear too heavy a 
burden. 
I have showed how the social equality theory illuminates a 
number of key issues in employment law—from the field’s most 
enduring questions (Is employment-at-will the correct baseline rule 
for job termination?) to those that are especially prominent today 
(Should we protect employees’ off-work speech and actions?).  The 
social equality theory thus provides a fitting alternative to existing 
theories of employment law, which focus either on promoting 
economic efficiency or on avoiding a hazily defined notion of 
exploitation.  Social equality offers an attractive overarching theory 
of individual employment law, one that offers traction in 
addressing important doctrinal issues. 
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